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Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal





In an 1873 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Myra
Bradwell admission to the Illinois Bar because she was a woman.1
Justice Joseph Bradley authored a famous concurrence in that case,
stating that "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex evidently unfits it" for law practice. 2 Since
then, women lawyers have not enjoyed smooth sailing pursuing their
vocation. In 1952 private law firms would only hire Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor as a stenographer even though she graduated third in
her class from Stanford Law School.3 The dean of the law school that
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg entered once asked her why she was oc-
cupying a seat that could be held by a man.4
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. B.A. Yale Univer-
sity. J.D. University of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank Professor
Gerald Boston and Professor Justin Brooks for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article. The author would also like to thank Randy Diamond, Vaughn Fisher, Tara Rafter,
and Shelley Villas for their research assistance.
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (16 Wall.) (1873). See also JANE FRIEDMAN,
AMERicA'S FiRST WOMAN LAWYER (1993) (a new biography about Myra Bradwell).
2. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
3. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVIsiBLE BAR 194 (1986); David G. Savage,
Legislative Past Guides O'Connor, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1988, at 1 (Chief Justice Rehnquist
finished first in that Stanford class). See Aaron Epstein, O'Connor Pivotal on Abortion:
Occupying the Middle Ground Gives the Justice Enormous Influence, PHILA. INQUIRER,
May 6, 1990, at E2.
4. Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist
Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 9.
The professional indignities that women have experienced extend
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law that pro-
hibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion,
and national origin.5 Title VII only covers women because a congress-
man thought that he could get the legislation defeated by adding wo-
men as a protected class. 6
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, the number of women en-
tering the professions has increased dramatically over the years, in
part, because of laws such as Title VII.7
However, what has not changed is the paucity of women and mi-
norities who have reached the top of their professions. 8 This is known
as the "glass ceiling" problem. 9 The 1991 Civil Rights Act created a
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h-6
(1988 & Supp. 1994)). Most states have their own employment discrimination laws, and
those laws do not protect partners either. See, e.g., Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101 to 10-103 (1993 & Supp. 1994); infra note 267.
6. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431, 441 (1965-1966) (Congressman Smith, a leading opponent of the original bill, pro-
posed the amendment "in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery"). See also Elizabeth A.
Sherwin, Sex Discrimination and State Constitutions: State Pathways Through Federal Road
Blocks, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 115, 115 (1984-1985) But see Carl M. Brauer,
Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J.S. HIsT. 43-45 (1983) (suggesting that the amendment
was added partly as a joke and partly because Congressman Smith thought that women
should be protected by Title VII if blacks were to be protected).
7. See, e.g., MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 20
(1994); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition III: Justice O'Connor and the
Destabilization of the Griggs Principle of Employment Discrimination, 14 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP. 315, 320 (1992) ("The improvement in minority/female employment op-
portunity during the past quarter century has been enormous. Much of this improvement
is attributable to equal employment opportunity laws."); Recent Cases, Employment Law -
Gender Discrimination-Third Circuit Rules That Denial of Promotion Based on an
Equally Applied Legitimate Subjective Criterion Is Not Discriminatory, 106 HARV. L. REV.
2039, 2039 (1993) (discussing "the increasing number of women and minorities entering the
legal profession"); Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Breaking the Glass Ceiling, 16 HUM. RTs.,
Spring 1989, at 40, 41 (Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia says that women lawyers "have come a long way").
8. See, e.g., Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress
Towards Gender Equality, 57 FORIHAM L. REV. 111, 119 (1988) (Chief Judge of the New
York State Court of Appeals reports that the 1988 American Bar Association Commission
on Women study reveals that women lawyers are not rising to the highest positions in the
legal profession and that bias against them continues); Diane Crothers, Owning the Power
of the Law: Women Learn That to Advance Their Rights, They Must Understand the Law,
20 HUM. RTs., Fall 1993, at 12, 29 (women are now 43% of law school graduates, 31% of
attorneys, and 23% of ABA members; yet, "as of 1992, only four of 58 chairs of ABA
standing committees are women and 27 states have no women representatives in the
ABA's House of Delegates").
9. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LEAFLET, BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING (1989)
("'Glass ceiling' is the phrase used to describe the artificial barriers, based on attitudinal or
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national Glass Ceiling Commission' ° to address the problem, and the
national press has frequently discussed the professional obstacles fac-
ing women and minorities." Studies by the U.S. Department of La-
organizational bias, that prevent qualified individuals from advancing within their organi-
zation and reaching their full potential .... "). The term "glass ceiling" became popular
after its use in the Wall Street Journal. Karen Blumenthal, Corporate Woman, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 24, 1986, § 4, at 7. See Fred Alvarez, Affirmative Action Enforcement: Confronting
the Glass Ceiling, ALI-ABA Course of Study on Advanced Empl. Law and Litig., Dec. 2-4,
1993, at 2 (citing Lynn Martin, The Glass Ceiling Initiative-Q & A (Aug. 8, 1991) (fact
sheet released at Labor Secretary's press conference)).
The first press report using the term appeared in a United Press International Lifestyle
wire story. Patricia McCormack, Woman's World; The Nation's Judges and Women Today,
May 21, 1985. Search of LEXIS, Nexis News Library, US file (Nov. 2, 1994). That article
described a speech given by Muriel Fox, Chairwoman of the National Organization for
Women's (NOW) Legal Defense and Educational Fund, at her acceptance of the New
York NOW Chapter's first Eleanor Roosevelt Leadership Award. The article quotes Ms.
Fox as saying "there is a 'glass ceiling' in the middle of the ladder leading to the top, and it
cannot be seen. But when the women run into it they bump their heads and cannot move
beyond it without the women's movement."
The first newspapers to use the term, even before the Wall Street Journal, included the
Los Angeles 77mes and the San Antonio Executive. See Mary Sewell Causey & David
Roberts, City's Word Industry Woman's World, SAN ANTONIO EXEc., Feb. 24, 1986, at 1;
Lynn Smith, Advisers Warn of Pitfalls in Office Romances, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 14, 1986, § 5,
at 1. One of the first references to the problem in the legal arena was Women in Law: The
Glass Ceiling, A.B.A. J., June 1,1988, at 49. The first law review article to discuss the term
appears to be Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1163, 1187 (1988).
10. Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e). Title II of the Civil Rights Act is called the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991. According
to § 202(a) of this Act, "Congress finds that-(1) despite a dramatically growing presence
in the workplace, women and minorities remain underrepresented in management and
decisionmaking positions in business; (2) artificial barriers exist to the advancement of
women and minorities."
The Glass Ceiling Commission was created to study the causes of glass ceiling barriers
and to propose solutions. ld. at § 203(a). See also 57 Fed. Reg. 10,777 (1992). See gener-
ally Alvarez, supra note 9 (laying out the federal government's actions regarding the glass
ceiling problem); David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
ALI-ABA Course of Study on Advanced Empl. Law and Litig., Dec. 2-4, 1993, at 66
(describing the creation of the Glass Ceiling Commission and prior Department of Labor
approach to the issue).
11. There have been many national news and magazine stories on the glass ceiling
issue. See, e.g., Amy Saltzman, Trouble at the Top, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 17,
1991, at 40-42; Amanda Troy Segal, Corporate Women, Bus. WK., June 8, 1992, at 74-78;
Margot Slade, Law Firms Begin Reigning In Sex-Harassing Partners, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25,
1994, at B12. See also John Greenwald, The Board vs. the "Babe," TIME, Aug. 30, 1993, at
39. The television networks have covered the issue as well. See, e.g., 20/20 (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 3, 1992) (interview with attorney Nancy Ezold regarding her sex discrimina-
tion lawsuit against the law firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen.)
The Illinois case of Beall v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. (Cook Cty.
Cir. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992), received extensive press coverage as an example of the
glass ceiling problem. The plaintiff, Ingrid Beall, was the first woman partner in the
world's largest law firm. She alleged that the firm discriminated against her by freezing her
November 1994]
bor and by various private groups have concluded that discrimination
created this glass ceiling.12 For example, a recent survey of 800 law
partners and associates found that one in six women felt that they had
been sexually harassed within the past three years, and that 51% of
the women felt that they had been harassed at some point in their
careers.
13
Significantly, these studies of the legal profession's glass ceiling
suggest that women partners are no less the victims of sexual harass-
out of the partnership once she became too successful. A partial list of the newspaper
articles covering the BeaU case includes: Michael Abramowitz, One Woman v. Her Law
Firm, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1991, at D1; Bill Grady et al., Largest Law Firm Faces Sex-Bias
Suit, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1991, Bus. Sec. at 3; Barbara Presley Noble, Making a Difference:
Bringing Suit Against Her Own Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 3, at 4; Saturday Ticker,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1992, (Bus. Sec.), at 1; Legal Beat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1991, at B8;
Woman Sues to Rise in Law Firm, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A2; Lawyer Sues for Sex
Discrimination, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1991, at 4a. Beall was also interviewed on
the Cable News Network (CNN) shortly after the lawsuit was filed. The author of this
Article was one of the attorneys who represented Beall.
Dr. Frances Conley's resignation from her 25-year tenured professorship at Stanford
Medical School due to alleged incidents of sexual harassment was also treated by the press
as an example of the glass ceiling. Dr. Conley recalled instances in which her male peers
fondled her legs under the table and called her "honey" in the operating room. Dr. Conley
eventually returned to Stanford after receiving commitments from its President and others
to root out sex discrimination at the Medical School. See Citing Sexism, Stanford Doctor
Quits, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1991, at A22; Sue Hutchison, Stanford Doctor Won't Quit After
All, PHILA. INOUIRER, Sept. 6, 1991, at A10; Richard Saltus, Stanford Surgeon Tells How
She Was Harassed, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1991, at 32. Another sex discrimination case
that has received extensive press coverage involves a woman scientist who recently pre-
vailed in her lawsuit against the National Institute of Health. See Marcia Coyle, A Scien-
tist's Gender-Bias Case Centers on Mentoring, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at A14 (first sex
discrimination case by a scientist against the National Institute of Health goes to trial);
Cracks in the Glass Ceiling, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Apr. 4, 1994, at 3 (discussing the
advisory verdict in favor of Dr. Margaret Jensvold).
12. See Marilyn Elias, Unjust Salaries for Female Lawyers, USA TODAY, Aug. 31,
1993, at 1D (Women lawyers' paychecks would be 15% higher if there were no sex discrim-
ination according to a field study based on 884 lawyers who graduated from the University
of Michigan; women overall earned 61% of what men earned); Greenwald, supra note 11
("In a recent poll of 439 female executives, the recruiting firm Korn-Ferry found that 60%
had been sexually harassed during their careers."); Bruce Rutledge, Women Lawyers: A
Status Report, BARRISTER MAG., 30, 31 (Fall 1991) (providing results of an ABA report on
The State of the Legal Profession 1990 showing that 45% of men and only 18% of women
make partner); ABC Evening News (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 8, 1993) (UCLA and
private consulting group study shows that women executives earn only two-thirds of what
male executives earn). But see Sylvia Nasar, Women's Progress Stalled: Just Not So, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, § 3, at 1.
13. Harassment in the Firm, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 13, 1993, at 4A (quoting a Na-
tional Law Journal study). See also HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 114-15 (interviews with
women revealed that many have been sexually harassed by their male professional
colleagues).
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ment and discrimination than women associates.14 Women law part-
ners have become increasingly unhappy during the last several years.15
Title VII is partly responsible for this because it does not protect bona
fide women partners from discrimination even though it protects the
associates or employees who work for them.16 Thus, by making part-
14. See infra notes 70, 71, 80, and 89.
15. Rutledge, supra note 12, at 31; see infra note 71. This greater dissatisfaction sug-
gests that the glass ceiling is not shattered once a woman makes partner. See, e.g., Glass
Ceiling Commission Hears Plaintiff Lawyer, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 494, at 6 (May 17,
1994) (plaintiff's lawyer says to the Commissioh that legal changes are needed since wo-
men who make partner face the reality that civil rights laws may no longer protect them
because court decisions include partners in the definition of employer). This Article con-
centrates on the barriers keeping women partners from reaching the top positions within
their law partnerships and the profession. However, much of the evidence relied upon will
involve studies of associates since more research has been done in that area. See, e.g.,
Grace M. Giesel, The Business Client is a Woman: The Effect of Women as In-House
Counsel on Women in Law Firms and the Legal Profession, 72 NEB. L. REv. 760, 774-86
(1993) (discussing numerous studies regarding why women associates do not make partner
in numbers comparable to men).
Despite this dissatisfaction, there have been comparatively few discrimination lawsuits
brought by lawyers against their firms. In Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 266 (10th
Cir. 1987), the Tenth Circuit explained that the paucity of such lawsuits is due to the low
numbers of minorities and women that have been in the profession until recently. Another
scholar suggests that lawyers hesitate to sue their firms partly because they fear being
blacklisted within the "closed society" of the bar. Kenneth J. Wilbur, Wrongful Discharge
of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to Further Professional Responsibility, 92 DICK. L. REv.
777, 778 n.9 (1988). See also Gender Bias Charges Have Been Rare So Far, S.F. DAILY J.,
Nov. 25, 1991, at 1 (quoting the author of this Article as stating that women lawyers often
do not sue their firms because it hurts their chances for success at the firm in the short
run).
However, the number of these lawsuits appears to be increasing. See, e.g., Charles S.
Caulkins & James J. McDonald, Jr., Lawyer Terminations Increasingly the Subject of Em-
ployment Discrimination Suits, 65 FLA. BAR J. 27 (1991); Julie Tamminen, Law Firms Face
New Challenges in Their Roles as Employers, LAw PRAc. MGm-r., Mar. 1991, at 40-41
("While lawyers may not have dared to sue their own firms in the past, they are now doing
so with increasing frequency.").
16. See, e.g., Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that a partner is
not an employee for the purpose of a discriminatory employment suit); infra note 92. The
corporate law firm is especially important for an analysis of sex discrimination in the law
because it embodies "the primary function of the legal system.. . 'greasing the wheels of
capitalism'... [by] providing advice to clients about the myriad rules that order business
affairs." HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 16. As sociologist Cynthia Fuchs Epstein states:
[T]hese firms constitute a network of legal institutions not matched anywhere in
the world. Their clients are the largest corporations, commercial banks, and in-
vestment houses, and a few rich men and women. They derive a good deal of
their power from their ability to "make" law in this country by influencing legisla-
tion and the way it is implemented, as well as by working on many precedent-
setting cases.
CYNTHIA FucHs EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 176 (1993). See also Deborah K. Holmes,
Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective,
12 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 9, 10 n.3 (1990) (citing BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE
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ner, these women have become even more vulnerable to sexual har-
assment and to other forms of sex discrimination.
Admittedly, women and minority partners are protected from
certain other forms of misconduct because all partners have to act as
fiduciaries toward one another.17 In addition, the rights and duties of
most partners are generally established by a partnership agreement. 18
Yet judicial statements about fiduciary relationships have emphasized
partners' duties to avoid financial conflicts of interest and to fulfill
information disclosure obligations rather than their duty to avoid
discrimination.1 9
This Article focuses on the glass ceiling problem as it affects wo-
men law partners.20 Its thesis is that an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing [hereinafter an "implied covenant"] governs all part-
nership agreements and that this covenant prohibits partners from dis-
criminating against each other on the basis of gender. Several courts
have ruled that an implied covenant of good faith can prohibit work-
LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12, 13 (1985)) (most attorneys are employed in private
practice).
17. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 547-48 (N.Y. 1928) (delineating a
partner's fiduciary obligation); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1078 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (delineating a partner's fiduciary obligation).
18. The number of lawyers practicing as partners grew from 92,442 in 1970 to 190,187
in 1980. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 266 n.17 (citing BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 167 (107th ed. 1987)). For a discussion of the
reasons that detailed written partnership agreements should be used by all law firms, see
Gail Diane Cox, Smile When You Say That, Partner, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 3, 1989, at 1.
19. See, e.g., Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893) (detailing such conduct as
being prohibited by fiduciary duties); Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ill. 1953)
("The fiduciary relation prohibits all forms of trickery, secret dealings and preference of
self in matters relating to and connected with a partnership and joint venture.").
20. This Article's reasoning applies to racial discrimination as well. However, this
Article does not focus on protecting partners from race discrimination because it appears
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 could be used by an African-American or white partner seeking to
attack race bias related to a partnership contract. Cf. Note, Applicability of Federal Anti-
discrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV. 282, 295-300
(1977) (emphasizing that § 1981 guarantees all persons the same right to contract as white
citizens). Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified that the right "to make and en-
force contracts" in § 1981 includes "the making, performance, modification, and termina-
tion of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1988 & Supp. VI 1994).
However, § 1981 does not cover sex discrimination. Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking
Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, this Article analyzes how the common-law
implied covenant of good faith protects women partners from discrimination. Although
this Article concentrates on women law partners, its legal analysis is also applicable to
women partners in other professions.
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place discrimination. 21 These cases are supported by the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding,22 as well as by
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in United States v. Burke, in which
he stated that an employment discrimination claim "is easily envi-
sioned as a contractual term implied by law."23 Several commentators
have made similar arguments.24 Moreover, this thesis is consistent
with the strong public policies against sex discrimination evident in
Title VII,25 state anti-discrimination laws,26 and various judicial
decisions.27
21. See High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (holding that
age discrimination allegation can support a claim for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding
that age discrimination claim supports breach of contract action); Beall v. Baker & McKen-
zie, No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. at 10-11 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992) (plain-
tiff stated a valid cause of action by claiming that constructive removal from her
partnership with a discriminatory purpose violated the implied covenant of good faith);
Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Mich. 1971) (allowing civil dam-
ages for race discrimination); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or.
1984) (permitting common-law tort action for sexual harassment). See generally Marc D.
Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 68
n.12 (1985) (listing cases); Jane P. Mallor, Discriminatory Discharge and the Emerging
Common Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 651 (1986) (discussing common-
law discrimination cases).
22. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). The Court in Hishon ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 enabled a female law firm associate to state a claim of sex discrimination on
the basis of the partnership selection process. The Court stated that, if proven, this could
constitute discrimination in the "term[s], condition[s], or privilege[s]" of her employment.
Id. at 77. See also Masterson v. LaBrum & Doak, 846 F. Supp 1224, 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that a law firm that discriminated against a female attorney by denying her part-
nership and treating her poorly, such as by introducing her to judges as "the new broad,"
must promote her to partner and award her back pay). But see Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (reversing a trial court verdict and ruling
that law firm did not discriminate in denying partnership to a woman associate).
23. 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1878 (1992) (examining the taxability of damages received in em-
ployment discrimination cases).
24. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimi-
nation Laws, NEw REPUBLIC, July 6,1992, at 30 (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBID-
DEN GROUNDS (1992) and suggesting that an implied contract not to discriminate would be
appropriate to impose on most employers); Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired
Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STArN. L. REv. 175, 201 (1993) (referring to
the implied contractual "right to be free from discrimination" possessed by at-will
employees).
25. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) ("The 'primary
objective' of Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end .....
26. See infra note 267-268 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1976) (holding that'employer's policy was
facially discriminatory); International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agric. Imple-
ment Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (defendant could not
exclude women from assembling batteries due to paternalistic concern about women's
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This Article has six parts. Part I provides a history of women in
the legal profession and describes the glass ceiling that women law
partners face. Part II explains why courts have concluded that Title
VII does not protect partners from employment discrimination. Part
II also demonstrates how Title VII decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court and by lower federal courts support the application of a com-
mon-law remedy against discrimination in the absence of statutory
protection.2 8 Part III shows how partnerships are governed by an im-
plied covenant of good faith, which is strengthened by the partner-
ship's fiduciary nature.2 9 Part IV explains why partnership expulsion
and personnel decisions must be made in good faith. Part V demon-
strates that a partner has an implied duty not to discriminate, regard-
less of which judicial definition of good faith is used. Finally, Part VI
shows that the common-law rule, which restricts when partners can
sue one another, should not block this kind of discrimination claim.
I. Women in the Legal Profession
Throughout most of America's history, women could not vote,30
maintain their own finances, 31 serve on juries,32 or hold elected of-
health and reproductive capabilities; further, employer did not establish that sex was a
bona fide occupational qualification).
28. This Article challenges the traditional view that categories of the common law are
virtually set in stone. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONs-rrtrrION 43 (1993)
("the common law of tort, contract, and property could be seen as a kind of natural state").
Under this traditional approach, discrimination is a public-law problem that the common-
law categories do not address. Yet this view fails to recognize that the common law is not
"a natural or unchosen baseline. Instead its principles amounted to a controversial regula-
tory system that created and did not simply reflect the social order." Id. at 50. It reflects
the legal rules and biases of a free market economic system. Professor Catherine MacKin-
non argues that some supposedly objective categories are not sacrosanct because they re-
flect power relations, not necessarily the natural state of things. CATHERINE A.
MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 164 (1987). The critical race scholars have issued a
similar challenge to traditional First Amendment law. See generally MARI J. MATSUDA ET
AL., WORDS THAT WOUND (1993). This Article shows why the public law/common law
distinction has broken down regarding the matter of sex discrimination.
29. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The
Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAw. 1, 24-25 (1993) ("The 'good faith' requirement draws
upon both the fiduciary law of cooperative relationships and the contract law of adversarial
relationships.")
30. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that women were not given the
right to vote until the Nineteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution passed in 1920,
approximately 55 years after African-American men were given this same right by the
Thirteenth Amendment).
31. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 9. Courts even ruled that women could not own prop-
erty by themselves. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N.C. 337 (1885). See also Nickie
McWhirter, It's Still a Man's World, DET. NEws, Nov. 16, 1993, at 9A (stating that just
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fice.33 Many states prohibited women from becoming lawyers because
they supposedly lacked the necessary intelligence and toughness.34
Formal state-sponsored discrimination has now been virtually elimi-
nated, and the numbers of women entering law schools and the legal
profession are approaching the numbers of men.35 Yet, studies show
that, because of discrimination, women lawyers and other profession-
als hit a glass ceiling and rarely reach leadership positions in their law
firms, law schools, or in public life.36 This Section describes the his-
tory of discrimination against women in the law, the origins of the
glass ceiling problem, and the situation faced by women partners in
law firms today.
before civil rights legislation passed in 1964, it was virtually impossible for women "to get a
bank loan, buy a house, buy a car, even get a charge card without a male co-signer and
guarantor"). Sex discrimination has also denied women the right to retain possession of
their offspring. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 196 (reporting that in the mid-1800s it was
impossible for a divorced woman to receive custody of her children; "fathers had a right to
custody of their legitimate minor children that was absolute").
32. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 9.
33. Id.
34. For example, Iowa and Wisconsin had statutes indicating that only men could
practice law. MoRELLo, supra note 3, at 12,23. Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in the
Bradwell case takes the typical view that women were too frail to participate in the hurly
burly of the legal world. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (16 Wali.)(1873).
35. Women currently make up 43% of law school graduates. Crothers, supra note 8.
The proportion of women in law schools nationwide went from 4% in 1964 to nearly 40%
in 1984. MoRELLo, supra note 3, at 248. The number of women entering the legal profes-
sion increased nearly tenfold from 12,000 to 116,000 between 1973 and 1986. Id. See also
Arthur Goldgaber, Glass Ceiling Remains for Women Going for Partner, L.A. Bus. J., Dec.
10, 1990, at 33. A 1991 survey of the nation's largest firms revealed that women made up
37% of all associates. Giesel, supra note 15, at 773.
36. See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 15, at 773 (women represented at most 11% of all
partners in the nation's largest law firms as of 1991); Rhode, supra note 9, at 1178-79:
Between the early 1960's and the mid 1980's, the percentage of women in the
legal profession increased from 3 to 14 percent, but they still constituted only 5
percent of the partners at the nation's 100 largest law firms and a handful of key
judicial and governmental decision makers. Overall, female attorneys in the mid
1980s were less than half as likely as male attorneys to be partners in a firm,
earned approximately 40 percent less, and were disproportionately represented in
low-prestige specialties.
(footnotes omitted). See also Pamela Brogan, Glass Houses: Gender Pay Gap Found
Among Congress' Staff, Hous. PosT, Dec. 19, 1993, at Al, A29 (the glass ceiling is an
invisible barricade that frustrates minorities and women from progressing up the corporate
ladder and wage scale traditionally held by men); Goldgaber, supra note 35, at 33; Rut-
ledge, supra note 12, at 31 (a report from the ABA Young Lawyer's Division entitled The
State of the Legal Profession 1990 concluded that women lawyers were less likely to be
promoted and made less money than men because "[w]omen in all levels of the profession
deal with some degree of sexual discrimination").
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In the 19th century women faced innumerable road blocks to be-
coming a lawyer including statutory restrictions, 37 hostile state bar as-
sociations,38 exclusively male law schools, 39 and biased judges. 40
Nonetheless, a few male judges and lawyers opened doors for the first
women lawyers. 41 Industrialization and the Civil War created job
37. Iowa, for example, restricted bar admission to 'any white male person, twenty-
one years of age, who is an inhabitant of this State,' and who satisfies the court that 'he
possesses the requisite learning'.... MORELLO, supra note 3, at 12 (citing IOWA CODE
§ 1610 (1851)). Wisconsin had a law that said: "To entitle any such person to practice as
such attorney ... he shall be first licensed by order of one of the judges thereof made in
open court." Id. at 23 (emphasis added). The male bias of these statutes was used in both
states to resist admission of women to the bar. Id. at 12, 23.
38. For example, Myra Bradwell's application to the Illinois State Bar was turned
down in the 1860s because she was a woman. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 17. Nonetheless,
Ms. Bradwell became the publisher of the Chicago Legal News and fought for improve-
ments in the legal system, women's rights, and the situation of the mentally ill. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 1. The Chicago Legal News in 1869 contained what appears to be the first
published reference to a woman practicing law in a rural area of Iowa. MORELLO, supra
note 3, at 11. Morello assumes that Bradwell only devoted herself to local disputes be-
cause the Iowa bar did not admit women, and local practice did not require state bar ac-
ceptance at that time. Id.
39. In 1869 Lemma Barkaloo was apparently the first woman to be admitted into a
law school when she enrolled at the Law Department of the Washington University in St.
Louis. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 44. Nonetheless, in 1886, Yale Law School added lan-
guage to its course catalog specifying that "[iut is to be understood that the courses of
instruction are open to persons of the male sex only, except where both sexes are specifi-
cally included." Id. at 92. "Not until 1972 did all accredited law schools admit women."
Rhode, supra note 9, at 1173 (citing Donna Fossum, Women in the Legal Profession: A
Progress Report, 67 WOMEN LAW. J. 1 (1981)).
40. Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in the Bradwell case is typical. 83 U.S. 130,
139 (16 Wall.) (1873). Another example of this attitude comes from Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice Edward Ryan's decision rejecting a woman lawyer's application for admis-
sion to the Wisconsin State Bar in 1875. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 23. Justice Ryan said,
We cannot but think the common law wise in excluding women from the profes-
sion of law .... The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the
bearing and nurture of the children of our race, and for the custody of the homes
of the world, and their maintenance in love and honor. And all lifelong calling of
women, inconsistent with these radical and social duties of their sex, as is the
profession of law, are departures from the order of nature, and when voluntary,
treason against it.
Id. at 24.
41. In 1869 Belle Babb Mansfield was apparently the first woman admitted to a state
bar, but it took the creative legal reasoning of a male judge to make this possible given
Iowa's statute restricting admission to males:
The matter came before Justice Francis Springer, then one of the most liberal and
progressive judges in Iowa. Springer agreed that Belle Mansfield had the neces-
sary qualifications of intellect and character to practice law but felt limited by the
wording of the admissions statute. In order to circumvent the gender provisions,
Springer relied on another Iowa statute which held that "words importing the
masculine gender only may be extended to females." Then Judge Springer went
one step further. He declared that when a statute contained an affirmative decla-
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openings and greater social mobility, giving women new opportuni-
ties.42 Women finally gained the right to vote in 1920 because of the
efforts of the suffragette movement, which encouraged women to be-
come involved in public affairs.43 The massive changes caused by
World War II brought even more women into the work force.44 In
1950 Harvard Law School opened its doors to women.45
These changes were met with hostility from the predominantly
male legal culture, which believed that "[t]he simple truth of the mat-
ter is that women as a class are not endowed by their Creator with
either the physical or mental attributes which fit them for a legal ca-
reer. ' 46 For example, in 1918 Lady Willie Forbus was the valedicto-
rian of her class at the University of Michigan Law School, yet the law
ration of gender, as the Iowa admissions statute had, it could not be construed as
implied denial of the right to females.
MORELLO, supra nbte 3, at 12. Mansfield was certainly deserving. She had been the vale-
dictorian of Iowa Wesleyan College and had a reputation as a "skilled debater and a bril-
liant student of the classics." Id. at 11. She had clerked at her brother's law firm as well.
Id. at 11-12. Morello also provides a list indicating the first woman lawyer admitted to the
bar of each state. Id. at 37-38.
In 1876 Belva Lockwood proposed legislation known as the "Lockwood bill," which
sought to obtain the admission of women to the federal courts. Id. at 34-35. The bill was
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Benjamin F. Butler. Id. at 34. See also
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that Lockwood persuaded the sympathetic con-
gressman to introduce the bill). The "Lockwood bill" was introduced after Belva Lock-
wood was "denied the right to practice in the United States Supreme Court." MORELLO,
supra note 3, at 34 (quoting Cm. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 10, 1877). It eventually passed and
became law. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 9, 11, 66. Young women in nineteenth-century society were also prodded to
prepare to become homemakers. Rhode, supra note 9, at 1165. Despite its domestic pur-
pose, the education these women received made it possible for them to consider becoming
professionals. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS 376-77 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980) ("Perhaps
the most visible female profession in the 19th century was writing."); id. at 378 ("The pro-
fession that counted by far the most women in the 19th century was teaching."); id. at 381
("Women's entrance [in the 19th century] into the more prestigious-and better paying-
professions of medicine and law was less easy and acceptable to men."); MORELLO, supra
note 3, at 9-11 ("Education was becoming more of a possibility, particularly for upper-class
young women who were encouraged to attend seminaries .... As women succeeded at
traditionally male jobs, all kinds of opportunities suddenly became available.... The Civil
War and westward expansion provided women with opportunities to serve in occupations
that previously had been closed to them.").
43. See, e.g., CAROL HYMOwrrz & MICHAELE WEISSMAN, A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
AMERICA 278-84 (1978).
44. See KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHoicEs 4-5 (1985); Suzannah Bex Wilson, Note,
Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: The Key to Widespread Social Re-
form, 67 IND. LJ. 817, 819-20 (1992) (documenting increased number of women in work
force during World War H).
45. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 100.
46. Id. at 199 (quoting N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1901).
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school's dean told her that a law firm would only hire her if she ap-
plied for a stenographer position.47 In 1934 a Texas state senator re-
sponded to the first nomination of a woman to be a state court judge
by saying that "a married woman ought to be home washing dishes. '48
Moreover, many of the most talented women to enter American law
schools in the 1950s and 1960s were subjected to ridicule or criticism
by their male peers. 49 This hostile attitude limited the growth in the
number of women entering the legal profession from 1920 through the
1960s. 5
0
47. Id. at 198.
48. Id. at 236 (citing Rebekah S. Greathouse, Hitlerism in Texas, WOMEN LAW. J.,
Feb. 1935, at 33).
49. The ordeal suffered by United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg typifies the experiences of women attorneys in the 1950s. In 1959 Ginsburg gradu-
ated number one in her class from Columbia University Law School. She had been a
member of the Harvard Law Review before transferring to Columbia. After graduation,
every law firm to which she applied denied her employment. Id. at 207.
Finally, she landed a position as a law clerk for a federal district judge but "'as anyone
familiar with the subject knows .... a man with those grades from that school could have
gotten a clerkship in a [f]ederal appeals court, if not the United States Supreme Court."'
Id. (quoting N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1972). Ginsburg later became the first female tenured
professor at Columbia University'Law School. Id. Justice O'Connor faced similar humilia-
tion. Id. at xii.
Rita Hauser, a senior partner at New York's prestigious law firm Stroock, Stroock, &
Lavan, realized that "not even a Fulbright fellowship, a doctorate and an honors law de-
gree could get her employment on Wall Street." Id. at 207. She was told by a New York
law firm "to forget about an international practice, since women couldn't be expected to
travel." Id. Despite these admonitions she eventually became a U.S. Representative to
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Id.
Geraldine Ferraro, an honors graduate of Fordham Law School, was told during her
fifth interview with a prestigious Wall Street law firm, "We're sorry, but we're not hiring
any women this year." Id. at 194.
When Elizabeth Dole attended Harvard Law School, women comprised five percent
of the first-year class. One male peer said to her, "What are you doing here-taking the
place of a male who could really use a Harvard education!" David Behrens, Elizabeth
Dole Takes Her Leave from the Corridors of Public Power, NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1990, at 60.
Rose Elizabeth Bird, former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, described
her law school experience by saying, "I had been discouraged at Boalt Hall [University of
California at Berkeley] from going into trial work because it was the belief of most of the
professors that women were emotionally not suited for that type of work." MORELLO,
supra note 3, at 243 (citing Shawn D. Lewis, BARRISTER MAO., Spring 1983, at 26). While
working as a public defender, a judge once ordered her out of his courtroom because he
was not accustomed to seeing women attorneys. Id.
The first woman elected President of the American Bar Association, Roberta Cooper
Ramo, could not get a job in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area of North Carolina after
graduating from the University of Chicago Law School in 1967. Ramo was elected in 1994.
David Margolick, At the Bar More Than A Century After Its Founding, A New Honorific
at the ABA; Madam President, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1994, at A19.
50. See Rhode, supra note 9, at 1174 ("Women remained under [one] percent of the
legal profession until 1920, and it took another half century for their representation to
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Other businesses and professions shared this "homebound" con-
ception of women through the early 1960s. It was commonly felt that
"strength, endurance, drive, and ambition" were attributes that fe-
males lacked and that, in turn, justified the inequality between men
and women.51 Moreover, business owners believed that women did
not expect to have careers and, therefore, would not remain with the
firms long enough to warrant further training or advancement.52 Men,
on the other hand, received extra training and were promoted, while
women stagnated at low-level "uninteresting and monotonous occupa-
tions. '5 3 Thus, the "[differential treatment of women] was one of the
many pillars of social and familial stability and, for other reasons as
well, was viewed less as discrimination than as paternalism. '5 4
Title VII's passage in 1964 gave women a tool for attacking these
discriminatory practices and attitudes.55 The feminist movement of
the 1960s also challenged the view that women should stay at home
rather than pursue careers.56 These two catalysts, combined with the
civil rights movement in the South and the anti-war movement, revo-
lutionized our society's values and affected 1970s work places.57
reach [five] percent.") (citing Terence C. Halliday, Six Score Years and Ten: Demographic
Transitions in the American Legal Profession, 1850-1980, 20 LAW & Soc'y REv. 53, 62
(1986)).
51. CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC His-
TORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 203 (1990).
52. Id. at 206.
53. Id. at 203-04 (quoting EnzABETH BEARDSLEY BUTLER, WOMEN AND THE
TRADES: PITTSBURGH, 1907-1908, at 373 (1984)).
54. Id. at 199.
55. The addition of sex discrimination to the bill as "an accident, at worst a joke,
signifies how difficult it was to mobilize Americans to pass legislation guaranteeing equal-
ity by sex." Id. at 202. But see Brauer, supra note 6 (suggesting that the amendment ad-
ding a prohibition on sex discrimination to Title VII resulted from an odd coalition of
women's rights advocates and conservatives). Nonetheless, scholars view the passage of
Title VII as a historic turning point for the rights of women. See, e.g., HARRINOTON, supra
note 7, at 20, 107-08; Rhode, supra note 9, at 1178; Wilson, supra note 44, at 820.
56. The most influential book advocating that women pursue careers was BErry
FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYsTIQUE (1963). See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 9, at 1177
("Works such as Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, which described the cultural ori-
gins and limitations of domestic roles, provided important catalysts for personal reassess-
ment and social activism"). Moreover, activists like Gloria Steinem and NOW vigorously
lobbied for women to pursue their individuality and not be restrained by domestic roles.
See HARRINOTON, supra note 7, at 20, 107-08. In the early 1970s a movement gained force
to pass an Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for women. Id. at 20. See
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal-
ity, 80 YALE L. 871 (1971). The amendment was defeated because only 35 of the neces-
sary 38 states ratified it. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 651 (1986).
57. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 53-55:
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Many women wanted to pursue careers58 and fought against existing
forms of discrimination.5 9
In the late 1970s to mid 1980s, booming economic conditions in-
creased the number of women attorneys since the exponential expan-
sion of law firms produced a need for more associates.60 Although the
economy had slowed by the late 1980s, the number of women entering
law schools and the legal profession more closely than ever approxi-
But the Vietnam War was another kind of war for Americans. The discussion
over the moral nature of the United States involvement in Vietnam and the wide-
spread opposition to the war by college students raised other issues of social jus-
tice. Many of the women who supported the dissent, who marched in protests,
and who gave encouragement to young men who resisted the draft also became
involved in the women's movement. Law seemed to them a powerful tool for
protest and they made use of the places created by draft or draft-deferring young
men.
See also MORELLO, supra note 3, at 209 ("The 1970s were the turning point for many
women in the law. The revolutionary spirit of the college campuses extended to the con-
servative law schools and the even more conservative corporate law offices.") (emphasis
added); Rhode, supra note 9, at 1177 (stating that the period was distinguished by "changes
in the ideological climate"); Wilson, supra note 44, at 820 (stating that the period "her-
alded a renewed effort to present women with [new] options").
58. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d
257, 266 n.18 (10th Cir. 1987) (showing that 2.5% of law degrees were conferred upon
women in 1960, compared to 36.8% in 1984) (citing STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
148 (1987)); Rhode, supra note 9, at 1178 (from the 1960s to the mid 1980s, the percentage
of women in the legal profession went from 3% to 14%). The number of practicing female
attorneys quadrupled between 1970 and 1979. Jeffrey D. Horst, Note, The Application of
Title VII to Law Firm Partnership Decisions: Women Struggle to Join the Club, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 841, 842 (1983). This Note provides a useful chart:




Id. (citing Donna Fossum, Women in the Legal Profession: A Progress Report, 67 A.B.A. J.
578, 580 (1981)).
59. MORELLO, supra note 3. Women at New York University and Columbia Univer-
sity brought a sex discrimination suit against ten prestigious New York law firms for failure
to recruit female associates. Id. at 211. Female law students in Illinois brought suit against
the University of Chicago Law School alleging that it discriminated against its women stu-
dents in placement efforts. Id. at 213. Female law students at the University of California
at Berkeley demanded that the dean forbid a firm that had a "stated bias against women
lawyers" from participating in the school's career placement activities. Id.
60. See HARRINOTON, supra note 7, at 25-26; Holmes, supra note 16, at 11 ("One of
the most important changes during [the past thirty years] has been exponential growth in
the size of individual law firms. Between 1969 and 1980, the number of firms with more
than 100 lawyers quintupled from [20] to more than 100.") (citing R. L. Nelson, Practice
and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms, AM. B. FOUND RES. J.,
1981, at 98); Kaye, supra note 8, at 113.
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mated the number of men.61 Another problem then surfaced. These
women hit a glass ceiling.6 2
Susan Faludi described the problem in her best-selling 1991 book
Backlash:
If women have "made it," then why are nearly eighty percent
of working women still stuck in traditional "female" jobs-as secre-
taries, administrative "support" workers and salesclerks? And, con-
versely, why are they less than eight percent of all federal and state
judges, 6 3 less than six percent of all law partners,64 and less than
one half of one percent of top corporate managers? Why are there
only three female state governors, two female U.S. Senators, and
two Fortune 500 chief executives? Why are only nineteen of the
four thousand corporate officers and directors women65-and why
do more than half the boards of Fortune 500 companies still lack
even one female member? 66
Numerous surveys during the 1980s confirmed that women lawyers
felt like second-class citizens and held very few high-level jobs in the
judiciary, academia, and in private law firms.67 These surveys also
61. See supra note 35.
62. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
63. See also MORELLO, supra note 3, at 218 (reporting that when Sandra Day
O'Connor became an Associate Justice on the United States Supreme Court in 1981, only
900 of 20,000 judicial positions were occupied by women).
64. See also Goldgaber, supra note 35.
65. See also Ronald E. Roel, Legislatures Will Face the Nation; New Pressure Builds
on Congress for Host of Workplace Reforms, NEWSDAY, Dec. 30,1990, at 82 (reporting that
a UCLA study "found that women and minorities at Fortune 500 companies held fewer
than five percent of senior management positions"); Rochelle Sharpe, The Waiting Game:
Women Make Strides, But Men Stay Firmly In Top Company Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29,
1994, at Al (citing detailed study that shows that men still dominate upper level positions
at major corporations).
66. SusAN FALUDI, BAcKLAsH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WO-
MEN xiii (1991). These figures have changed slightly since the election of President Clin-
ton. For example, the number of women U.S. Senators has increased to six, due in part to
Clinton's election and the national reaction to Anita Hill's testimony regarding sexual har-
assment during Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See HARRING-
TON, supra note 7, at 117; Wilson, supra note 44, at 835 n.146 (referring to the outpouring
of anger from women over how the U.S. Senate handled allegations of sexual harassment
by Anita Hill against Thomas) (citing Marjorie Williams, From Women, An Outpouring of
Anger, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al).
67. See supra notes 8,12; FALuDI, supra note 66, at 257; Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 10,
n.4 (statistics on limited numbers of high ranked women in academia) (citing Marina An-
gel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the
Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 799, 802 (1988)); Kaye, supra note 8,
at 119-20 ("Decades after their entry into the big firms, women make up a third or more of
the associates but less than 8 percent of the partners" and a study of 70 women from the
Harvard Law School class of 1974 reveals that they lagged behind men in terms of the
"prestige" levels of their jobs. Comparable statistics exist within the judiciary, tenured law
faculty positions, and in the management of government and legal services organizations.)
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showed that firms have made a smaller percentage of female associ-
ates partners. 68 In addition, the few female attorneys who were ad-
(citing ABA Report: Women in Law Face Overt, Subtle Barriers, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1988,
at 1; MORELLO, supra note 3, at 218; Rhode, supra note 9, at 1178-79; J. ABRAMSON & B.
FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY ARE Now: THE STORY OF THE WOMEN OF HARVARD LAW
1974, at 298 (1986)); Wald, supra note 7, at 41 ("[O]nly six percent of the law school deans,
and 10 percent of tenured law school teachers are women. In four years from 1976-1980,
41 women were appointed to the federal bench; in the next eight years, only 31 were ap-
pointed."); Wilson, supra note 44, at 827 n.76 (less than 12% of the faculty at several top
law schools are women) (citing Tom Goldstein, Women in the Law Aren't Yet Equal Part-
ners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1988, at B7). See also Amee McKim, Note, The Lawyer Track:
The Case for Humanizing the Career Within a Large Law Firm, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 167, 175-
76 n.53 (1994) (describing the sacrifices made by women in the early years of private prac-
tice and the effects of a decision not to make such sacrifices on promotions and opportuni-
ties to work on prestigious assignments).
The problems that women encounter within their law partnerships take several forms.
Women are often channelled into the less prestigious areas of firms, such as family law,
where there is little chance of advancement. See Rhode, supra note 9, at 1179 (female
attorneys in the mid 1980s were "disproportionately represented in low-prestige special-
ties") (citing Survey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less, But They're Happy, 69
A.B.A. J. 1384, 1385 (1983)). Thus, Nancy Ezold could have avoided her lawsuit by ac-
cepting an offer to become a partner in the family law department of her firm, but she
turned it down. See Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88
(1993). Women partners also tend to lack the mentoring that leads male partners to the
top of the heap. Giesel, supra note 15, at 777. Thus, women partners often lack the busi-
ness contacts of their male colleagues. Infra note 80. Women have similar problems ad-
vancing in other areas of business. Saltzman, supra note 11 (reporting that only three
percent of the top executives at the largest American companies are women and the figure
has changed little in the last decade).
68. See Kaye, supra note 8, at 119-20 (Harvard Law study of 70 graduates found that
after ten years, fewer than a quarter of those women entering private practice were part-
ners, compared to more than half of the men) (citing ABRAMSON & FRANKLIN, supra note
67); Rutledge, supra note 12, at 31 (45% of men and 18% of women make partner). See
also Tom Goldstein, Women in the Law Aren't Yet Equal Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1988, at B7 (studies show that women attorneys are not advancing as quickly as males and
that women tend to be in comparatively low-prestige legal positions); Horst, supra note 58,
at 842 ("This new form of sex discrimination is vividly demonstrated by the inability of
female attorneys to succeed to the pinnacle of power, wealth, and prestige-law firm part-
nership. Although increasing numbers of female attorneys are being hired, significant
resistance to female partnership remains.") (citing Burke & Johnson, More Women on the
Way Up, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1981, at 1.); Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way to Go for
Women, Minorities; White Males Dominate Firms, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1 (From 1982
to 1988, the number of women partners increased only one percent per year; if this pattern
continues "by the year 2000, only one in five partners will be women.").
These lower rates of promotion are at least partly due to subjective evaluation systems
that permit male partner biases to filter through, constituting "a critical step in keeping
[women] below the 'glass ceiling."' Daniel Gyebi, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Favoring
Women and Minorities in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases Involving High-Level
Jobs, 36 How. L.J. 97, 113 (1993). See also Stacey B. Chervin, Employment Discrimination:
Breaking Through the Partnership Barrier in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 1992-93 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 203, 208 ("[M]any [law firms] regarded the selection of partners as personal
a decision as 'choosing a wife."') (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,77-78 n.10
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mitted to partnerships ran into roadblocks. They made less money
than their male counterparts69 and were frequently sexually harassed
(1984)); Giesel, supra note 15, at 777; Women's Exclusion From Top Management Studied,
Fair Empl. Prac. Summ. (BNA) 30 (Mar. 14, 1994) (stating informal subjective criteria play
the largest role in senior management promotions, creating a risk that discriminatory ste-
reotypes will influence the decision). The absence of senior male lawyers who are willing
to act as "mentors" for junior female lawyers compounds the problem.
69. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Men have always been paid higher
salaries than women regardless of the field. VICrOR R. FucHs, WOMEN's QUEST FOR Eco
NOMIC EQUALITY 49 (1988). In the mid 1980s "women earned only two-thirds as much as
the average man for each hour of work." Id. In the 1960s and 70s the difference in earn-
ings between racial groups narrowed, but the difference in earnings between the sexes
increased. Id. at 50. The literature on the wage differential between the sexes in the legal
field is voluminous. See Ann J. Gellis, Great Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession,
A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND. LJ. 941, 947 (1991) (Indiana gender bias study
reveals that "[w]omen lawyers make less than their male counterparts. Over half of the
women (53.1%) make under $40,000, compared with 20.6% of the men.") (citing INDIANA
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION
10 (Oct. 18, 1990); Holmes, supra note 16, at 19 ("[W]omen attorneys with more than nine
years of law firm practice earn just 32% of their male colleagues' incomes."); Rhode, supra
note 9, at 1179 ("Within a decade after graduation, men and women from the same law
school class were already finding significant differences in salary and advancement.") (cit-
ing ABRAMSON & FRANKLIN, supra note 67, at 298-99); Wilson, supra note 44, at 827 ("Fe-
male lawyers are also discriminated against in terms of salary. The Department of Labor
recently found that female lawyers and judges earn, on average, seventy percent of what
males earn in the same positions.") (citing Amy Saltzman, Trouble at the Top, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., June 17, 1991, at 40).
The Honorable Richard Posner has argued that women receive lower wages than men
and do less well professionally because women do not invest in themselves, not because of
discrimination. Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U.
Ciir. L. REv. 1311,1315 (1989). Specifically, women do more of the childrearing than men.
Id. See also Frances A. McMorris, Panel Offers Advice to Those Hitting the 'Glass Ceiling,'
N.Y. LJ., Dec. 6, 1993, at Al (quoting Ms. Davis, a former associate at Sullivan & Crom-
well, who left the firm after her first child was born: "I couldn't balance work and family. I
wasn't willing to make the sacrifice. I don't view that as a glass ceiling."). Posner asserts
that "[t]he average woman will therefore invest less in her human capital, causing her wage
to be lower than the average man's, since a part of every wage is repayment of the worker's
investment in human capital." Posner, supra at 1315. Others point out that women get
paid less because they generally bring in less business.
Yet most scholars believe, even while acknowledging women's greater domestic role,
that discrimination plays a substantial role in the lower wage rates of women and in their
inferior positions. See, eg., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 61-64
(1990)(arguing that anti-discrimination laws are important in making the "taste" for dis-
crimination unacceptable). Professor Mary Becker has argued that the so-called economic
models used to attack the anti-discrimination laws are highly flawed, Mary E. Becker,
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and Sexual
Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEo. LJ. 1659, 1663 (1991). See also John J. Donohue
HI, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1337 (1989)(rebutting Judge Posner's view).
There is no explanation other than discrimination for the common phenomenon dis-




by them.70 Women partners, therefore, became increasingly unhappy
with their legal jobs. They experienced a more sudden increase in job
dissatisfaction during the late 1980s than either male partners or fe-
male associates. 71
70. Greenwald, supra note 11. See also Gellis, supra note 69, at 943 (Indiana study of
women partners and associates finds that "[s]ignificant numbers of women report overt
discrimination, including physical and verbal sexual harassment") (citing INDIANA STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT supra note 69); David Margolick, Wall Street's Sexist Wall,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1980, at 58; Rutledge, supra note 12, at 32 ("Some of the most dis-
turbing findings in the YLD study concern sexual harassment. Sixty-three percent of the
women and half of the men who responded to the survey feel that incidences of sexual
harassment have stayed the same or increased in the last five years."); infra notes 89-90. A
recent survey of 30,000 male and female faculty members at 270 public and private institu-
tions found that 24% of female full professors had been sexually harassed during their
academic careers. Maryanne George, 1 in 7 Faculty Women Report Sex Harassment, DET.
FREE PRESS, Apr. 7, 1994, at 1. One of the coauthors of the study said, "We were surprised
to find that sexual harassment continues throughout a career, rather than just in the early
years." Id. This study further supports the evidence that women are still subjected to
sexual harassment after making partner.
71. See Rutledge, supra note 12, at 31 (ABA YLD study reveals that from 1984 to
1990, "the most sudden increase in dissatisfaction came from women partners. In 1984,
only 15 percent of women partners reported being dissatisfied with their work, but 42 per-
cent reported dissatisfaction in 1990. (The corresponding numbers for men are 9 and 22
percent.) That means almost half of the women who successfully climb the private practice
ladder to success find disappointment at the top."). Ingrid Beall's lawsuit against Baker &
McKenzie was based in part on the belief that male Tax Department partners could not
accept that she had become as financially successful as they were. She alleged, in part, that
they started to take away her opportunities to work and to sit on law firm committees the
year after her income reached almost a half-million dollars. See supra note 11. Cf.
Weisenhaus, supra note 68, at 48 ("[M]ore and more female attorneys, particularly on the
associate level, are showing dissatisfaction with life at the megafirms, and are leaving for
smaller firms, part-time work, teaching or other alternatives.").
The term "partner" has a double meaning that suggests that women may face difficul-
ties once they make partner. In addition to its business meaning, the term is also used to
describe domestic relationships between men and women, e.g., life partners or sexual part-
ners. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1979) (discuss-
ing claim that if a male employee prefers males as sexual partners, he will be treated
differently from a female who prefers male partners); Chervin supra note 68, at 208; Claire
Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties
and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 111, 155 (1993)("The word
'partner' carries a connotation of social intimacy not found in 'shareholder."'). Women
face the difficulty of being taken seriously in the business community due to stereotypical
perceptions of their domestic roles. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 341-42 (10th
Cir. 1986)(female lease analyst was told by a supervisor that women with too much educa-
tion create problems and was criticized for working despite having children); DONNA JACK
SON, How TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE FOR WOMEN 29 (1992) ("Over half of
working women say they've suffered unpleasant incidents at work due to off color sexual
jokes and demeaning comments about women."); id. at 45 ("In one study, adult men con-
sistently liked and trusted women who spoke self-effacingly more than women who spoke
with self-assurance.").
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Many states appointed gender bias task forces to study their
courts, and these bodies found that discrimination was endemic. 72 In
sum, "[t]he forces that once kept women out of the law altogether
simply have shifted now to keep them out of powerful positions within
the law."73 This pervasive discrimination leads women to feel that
they must outperform men to be their professional equals.74
72. The Chair of the ABA's Section on Litigation recently described the major
problems with the civil justice system and included gender bias among them. He said,
The Ninth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, 36 states, and the ABA are conducting
comprehensive studies on the degree to which racial and gender biases persist in
the court system. These studies cover everything from juror attitudes, to* the
treatment of court staff, to the manner in which women and minorities are treated
by courts and opposing litigants. They are all reaching the same conclusion: Bias
problems are not just perceived but real, and much work remains to be done.
Robert N. Sayler, Tigers at the Gates-The Justice System Approaches Melt Down, LrTG.,
Fall 1993, at 1, 2 (emphasis added). As Mona Harrington states:
Other evidence suggests that the courthouse is a site of particular tension
over female sexuality. Many state court systems, in the late eighties, published
extensive self-studies of gender bias operating in the courts, including the subjec-
tion of women lawyers to sexually charged attention from male judges, lawyers,
and court officials. The 1989 Massachusetts Gender Bias Study, for example, re-
ported that 64% of the women lawyers surveyed had observed male lawyers, in
court, making remarks or jokes that demean women, 43% had heard inappropri-
ate comments of a sexual or suggestive nature, and virtually everyone had heard
remarks about the clothing or physical appearance of women lawyers, and the use
of endearments such as "sweetheart" or "honey" directed at them.
HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 103. Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
writes, "In New York a vigilant, effective Implementation Committee is in place particu-
larly to address the fact that pervasive gender bias has been found in our court system."
Kaye, supra note 8, at 125 (citing Second Report of the Comm'n to Implement Recom-
mendations of the N.Y. Task Force on Women in the Courts (1987)); Wald, supra note 7, at
54 (discussing the 1988 ABA report on the position of women in the profession, Chief
Judge Wald asks, "What can we do to discourage the sexual advances and harassment from
court personnel that women report?").
See also Gellis, supra note 69, at 941 (stating that the 1988 ABA report found "persis-
tent gender discrimination throughout the legal profession"); Bill Grady et al., On the Law:
Women Fear Law Bias Still in the League, Cm. TRim., July 31, 1990, (Bus. Sec.), at 3. In a
famous Illinois case, a male lawyer wrote a letter to a woman lawyer recommending that
she get a "cliterectomy" given the hard-nosed legal position that she was taking. Bill
Grady et al., On the Law: Not So Civil Case for Commission, CH. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1990,
(Bus. Sec.), at 3.
73. MORELLO, supra note 3, at 250. She adds, "[s]tatistics [show that] while women
seem to be making important gains in entry-level positions, they still are not making a
significant impact on the prestigious and powerful areas of the law." Id. at 195. It seems
that with the passage of Title VII, "on paper, American citizens, male and female, now
enjoy equal rights and opportunities in almost all arenas of human endeavor. However, it's
a different story in human hearts and minds. Today the battle of the sexes seems more
vicious and brutal than ever before." McWhirter, supra note 31, at 9A.
74. "Women cannot merely match men's performance; in areas where women are tra-
ditionally perceived as weak, they must outperform their male colleagues. Women who
succeed are more tough, more committed to their careers, and more willing to take risks
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Moreover, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the recession created
serious economic problems for many of the law firms that had just
expanded and for the women lawyers who worked there.75 As busi-
ness declined, these firms had no way to pay their debts and suc-
cumbed to the high overhead costs they had accumulated. 76 Several
major law firms failed, leaving partners unemployed. 77 Other law
firms cut costs by firing groups of partners.78
than their successful male colleagues." Holmes, supra note 16, at 22. Professor Holmes
also cites other scholars who have reached the same conclusion. Id.
75. HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 37-38. See also Judith Schroer, Running From the
Law: Discontented Lawyers Flee Profession, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 1993, at B1 ("Brodersen
and Winkle say publicly what many practicing lawyers admit only privately: The law can
be a miserable profession, characterized by grueling hours, meaningless work, cutthroat
colleagues - and golden handcuffs.").
76. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, SHARK TANK 217 (1990) (chronicling the downfall of one
of the nation's largest law firms, Finley Kumble, this book explains that its partners started
deserting the firm when its debt, attributable to expansion and salaries, reached $83 mil-
lion); HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 29 (describing the high overhead items such as sophis-
ticated computer equipment, associate salaries, and high quality support staff). One
commentator has suggested that "the rise of in-house corporate counsel, and the conse-
quent challenge to private firms" has prompted increased specialization. See Holmes,
supra note 16, at 16. See also John H. Kennedy, "Reality" Check Coming in Legal Costs,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1992, (Econ.), at 81 ("Some companies are keeping more of their
legal work in-house"); Larry Smith, The Party's Over: Firms Invoke a Variety of Cost-
Cutting Measures, PRENTICE HALL L. & Bus., Jan. 7, 1991 (summarizing many of the cost-
cutting measures that were taken by law firms).
77. See, e.g., EISLER, supra note 76 (death of the Finley Kumble firm); Gail Diane
Cox, End Comes at Last to L.A. Firm: Debts, Doubts Left for Memel, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16,
1987, at 3 (describing closing of Memel, Jacobs & Ellsworth); Gail Diane Cox, "Lifeboat"
for Firms Going Under, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 5, 1988, at 8 (noting dissolution of three Los
Angeles firms); Mark Curriden, Atlanta's Law Firms Hit Comeback Trail, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
8, 1993, at 1 (between 1990 and 1992, three major Atlanta law firms closed shop); Jeff
Feeley, Midsizes in Turmoil, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 1989, at 1 (regarding the winding down of
a Baltimore law firm); Jan Hoffman, An End to a Law Firm that Defined a Type, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al (reporting the closing of the venerable New York City law firm
Shea & Gould); Jan Hoffman, Oldest Law Firm Is Courtly, Loyal and Defunct, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1994, at A16 (describing the demise of New York's oldest law firm, Lord, Day &
Lord, Barrett, Smith, and its courtly ways); Rita Henley Jensen, Attorneys Battle Job
Losses, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at 3 (noting the demise of the Boston law firm Gaston,
Snow); John H. Kennedy, Law Firms Apply the Breaks, Turn to Retrenching, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 19, 1992, at 80; Alexander Stille, The Fall of the House of Herrick, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 24, 1986, at 6 (reporting the sudden demise of a prominent and long-standing Boston
firm of 79 lawyers); Laurel S. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law
Firm Breakups, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1055, 1056 n.1 (1988) (listing firms that have dissolved
or broken up); James Warren, Shotgun Wedding, Fatal Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1988,
at 1 (describing the demise of Chicago law firm Isham, Lincoln & Beale); Gene Wein-
garten, Breaking Up: Requiem for a Heavyweight Law Firm, NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1981, at 1
(discussing factors that led to the break-up of Watson, Leavenworth).
78. See, e.g., Edward A. Adams, Shea & Gould's Ax, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 2
(detailing partners who have been fired by a New York firm); Jensen, supra note 77 (44%
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The press has highlighted these partner termination stories be-
cause they undermine the traditional view that partnership guarantees
lifetime security.7 9 The glass ceiling problem took on a new twist
since women partners were often the first to be fired because they did
not hold the top positions at their firms and usually were not business
"rainmakers." 80 In addition, more lawyers 'sued their firms in re-
of law firms surveyed experienced downsizing during the previous year); Randall Sambom,
Windy City Blues, NAT'L L.i., Oct. 21, 1991, at 2 (regarding the firing of lawyers at various
Chicago law firms); James Warren et al., On the Law, Cm. TPm., Mar. 8, 1988, (Bus. Sec.),
at 3 (twelve lawyers let go by Chicago law firm including partner Daniel Feldman, a First
Amendment expert); Winston & Strawn Asks [Six] Partners to Leave, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 14,
1989, (Bus. Sec.), at 6.
79. James Kim, Lawyers Feel the Squeeze: Job Security Is No Longer a Guarantee,
U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 16, 1990, at lB. See also Gail Appleson, Is Recession Triggering Lay-
offs at Law Firms, NAT'L L.I., Jan. 31, 1983, at 2 (regarding partners who are being fired).
These law firm firings have resulted in several lawsuits by partners against their ex-firms.
See, eg., Roan v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, 962 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1992); Beall v. Baker &
McKenzie, No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. (Cook Ct. Cir. Ct. Ch. Div., Aug. 18, 1992); Gail
Diane Cox, Former Rainmaker Sues Pillsbury, NAT'L L.i., July 5, 1993, at 3; Milt Policzer,
Ousted Partner Sues, NAT'L L.I., Jan. 20, 1992, at 2. Robert W. Hillman has stated:
Law firms are under siege. The traditional view of the law firm as a stable institu-
tion with an assured future is now challenged by an awareness that even the larg-
est and most prestigious firms are fragile economic units facing a myriad of risks
in their quests to survive and prosper. No longer can the law graduate join a
major firm with the sanguine assumption that the firm will not experience major
upheavals, turnover in partners, or, in extreme cases, receivership.
Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and
Leaving, 67 TEx. L. Radv. 1, 2 (1988) (citing, inter alia, Gail Diane Cox, A "Lifeboat" For
Firms Going Under, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 5, 1988, at 8; Gail Diane Cox, End Comes at Last to
L.A. Firm, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 16, 1987, at 3). See also John C. Buchanan, The Demise of
Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L.
Rav. 563, 575 (1994)("Yet these days, economic factors seem to have made money the
highest goal of lawyers."); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 63 (1988) ("'The practice of law is going through a crazy phase. There's a hysteria
out there. Some lawyers are making fortunes, while other firms are going under. People
feel they have to grab everything they can. As long as new business comes in, they can't
turn it down. It's out of control."').
80. Chief Judge Kaye states that "[r]ainmaking, or bringing in business-a key to the
inner sanctum of private firms-is hard for everyone, but particularly so for women; the
world of corporate general counsels who dispense that business is still all but closed to
them." Kaye, supra note 8, at 121. Chief Judge Wald agrees, "Women also suffer substan-
tial disadvantages in 'rainmaking'.... Women tend to have fewer business contacts...."
Wald, supra note 7, at 42. See also Ezra T. Clark III, Note, Title VII & The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: What Professional Firms Should Know, 7 B.Y.U. J. Pun. L. 99, 116 (1992); Jensen,
supra note 77 ("Mr. Corwin, a specialist in representing exiting partners and currently at-
torney for ex-partners at Boston-based Gaston, Snow added that so-called service partners,
rather than rainmakers, are the most likely to be asked to leave."); J. Craig Peyton, Firms
Consider Litigation Risk, NAT'L L.i., May 13, 1991, at 29 (advising firms that must termi-
nate lawyers to discharge those with the least seniority first because there is a seniority
exception in the discrimination laws-advice that would injure newcomers to firms such as
women and minorities). These authorities demonstrate that women partners will generally
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sponse to these cutbacks.8'
The federal government first addressed the glass ceiling problem
in 1988 when the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCCP) began tracking the progress of women, minori-
ties, and handicapped workers beyond entry-level jobs.82 The OFCCP
required federal contractors to include middle and upper- level man-
be let go before male partners because they cannot reach the most powerful and secure
positions within the partnership. Similarly, until recently, women were not able to obtain
the higher level positions within the American Bar Association. See, e.g., ABA COMMIs-
SION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, GOAL IX REPORT CARD 5 (1991) ("Women's partic-
ipation at leadership levels in ABA sections remains generally low. In 1988/89, only one
ABA section or division was chaired by a woman. The number remains the same in 1990/
91. Three years ago, 11 out of 25 sections or divisions had no women officers-this year 14
sections or divisions have no female officers ... the range of statistics ... suggests that
women's overall participation at leadership levels ... continues to be token rather than
institutionalized.").
Arthur Goldgaber reports one Los Angeles woman attorney as saying that "rainmak-
ing has much greater importance than before as a distinct, desirable feature in and of itself
and to a certain extent involves schmoozing that excludes women." Goldgaber, supra note
35. A woman partner from a Los Angeles law firm told Goldgaber that, "[w]omen do have
disadvantages when being judged for promotion to partner that have nothing to do with
their ability to handle legal work. For example, women have to work harder than men at
'rainmaking' because it is easier for men to socialize with potential clients in their spare
time." Id. She added that "I could never call up a 45-yr. old businessman and say, 'Hey,
how would you like to go to a football game."' Id.
See also EISLER, supra note 76, at 113-14:
At one large, national law firm, Los Angeles-based Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher...
[t]he life of an associate was not easy. There were no guarantees of partnership,
no matter how hard one worked. Female lawyers, fooled into thinking that with
hard work they could make partner, found out that the big firms could almost
always find a way to dump them, rather than admit them to the most exclusive
club.
Numerous commentators have discussed the problems that women face in trying to
act as rainmakers given their comparative lack of business contacts. Deborah Holmes has
stated that:
[N]o "old girls network" has sprung up to augment the "old boys network,"
which, by definition, excludes women. An overwhelming 85 percent of the wo-
men attorneys surveyed by the National Law Journal/West Publishing Co. in 1989
felt that generating new business was more difficult for women lawyers than it
was for their male colleagues. Of two associates being considered for partnership
at a law firm, the man may have an edge over the woman simply because his
friends, but not hers, are running corporations of their own and can field business
to the firm.
Holmes, supra note 16, at 23 (citation omitted). See HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 37-38
("With the onset of recession in the early nineties, many big firms, particularly in the East,
both slowed their recruiting and increased the 'weeding out' of their less desirable associ-
ates-a process that could only heighten the pressure on women.").
81. See, e.g., Caulkins & McDonald, supra note 15, at 27; Tamminen, supra note 15, at
40-41.
82. Alvarez, supra note 9, at 193. This is mandated by Executive Order Number
11246 that requires certain businesses receiving federal funds not to have disproportion-
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agement positions in corporate affirmative action plans.83 The
OFCCP restructured its compliance review program under a Glass
Ceiling Initiative, which encompasses a variety of businesses including
law firms.84 Ten businesses have been subjected to the third stage of
the OFCCP's glass ceiling reviews. 85
President Bush then signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
contained the Glass Ceiling Act. This Act established a Glass Ceiling
Commission to recommend ways to remove barriers that hinder the
professional advancement of women and minorities.8 6 The legislative
history of the Act viewed discrimination as the cause of the glass ceil-
ing, and it referred to sex discrimination by law firms as an
example.87
ately small numbers of minorities and women in various positions. MACK A. PLAYER ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATxON LAW 13, 155 (1990).
83. Alvarez, supra note 9, at 193. One of the other major reasons that women ad-
vanced so rapidly in the legal profession during the 1970s and 1980s was affirmative action
plans adopted by law schools and employers. See EPsTEN, supra note 16, at 55-56.
84. Alvarez, supra note 9, at 193. The details of the OFCCP actions are enumerated
in the Alvarez article. One goal of the initiative is to recognize and reward publicly those
companies that remove their own glass ceiling. Id. at 196.
85. Id. at 193 & n.1. The one law firm within the third stage of review is the prestigi-
ous, "white shoe" Wall Street firm of White-& Case. See also Law Firm Target of OFCCP
Review, 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 186 (Aug. 30,1993) ("The review, which was initiated in
early 1993, involves an in-depth examination of possible barriers hindering the promotions
of women and minorities to upper-management positions. The scope of the review extends
to both lawyers and support staff.")
86. The glass ceiling problem involves virtually all of the work force. See, e.g., Bro-
gan, supra note 36 (reporting that the personnel employed by Congress can be categorized
into two groups: "highly paid men who hold most of the power and lower-paid women
whose careers can be stunted by an institutional glass ceiling"); F. Anthony Comper, Why
Equality for Women Is a Necessity, AM. BANKER, Dec. 20,1990, at 6 (reporting that women
are "at the core of our human resources strategy for the 1990's" in the banking field and
that the goal of the banking industry will be to shatter the glass ceiling that women hit on
their way up the corporate ladder); Goldgaber, supra note 35 ("The [glass ceiling] problem
is not just tied to the law, there is still a general bias against women in business that it's
more appropriate for them to be at home than active in the highest level positions."); Paul
Wilkes, The Hands That Would Shape Our Souls: The Changing and Often Deeply Trou-
bled World of America's Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish Seminaries, 266 THE ATLANTc
59, 81 (Dec. 1990) (reporting on the glass ceiling thatwomen hit in the world of religion:
"The real problem for women isn't finding a first job .... There are jobs as college chap-
lains or assistants at bigger churches, or specialty jobs like music or education. . . . The
problem is when the choice comes down to a man or a woman for the average-sized parish,
or when an opening occurs in the bigger, most prestigious churches or temples.").
87. See Gyebi, supra note 68, at 113 ("[T]hese Congressional findings [regarding the
existence of a glass ceiling] provide evidence from which a court in a disparate impact case
could conclude there has been a subtle but widespread societal discrimination against wo-
men and minorities in the upper-level positions.").
Senator Robert Dole introduced the glass ceiling legislation and made the following
statement in its support: "While there are probably as many definitions of the glass ceiling
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Despite these laudable efforts, the OFCCP's impact on the glass
ceiling problem has been limited because it has only conducted a few
compliance reviews and because the Glass Ceiling Commission's role
is merely advisory.88 Moreover, a 1993 survey showed that law firm
partners and associates believed that sexual harassment against wo-
men remained a serious problem and that women continued to experi-
ence a glass ceiling of discrimination in partnership/management
decisions, assignments, and general career opportunities.89
as there are individuals affected by it, the issue boils down to eliminating artificial barriers
in the workplace which have served to block the advancement of qualified women and
minorities." 137 CONG. REC. S15,328 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991). He then described the
paucity of women in high-level corporate positions and stated that although he opposed
quotas, "the foregoing suggests that artificial barriers exist with respect to the upward mo-
bility of women and minorities." Id.
The official legislative history of the Act from the House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee referred to how one of the Act's purposes was to help end the negative effect
on the economy caused by "discrimination against women and minorities." CIvIL Rirmrs
ACr AND WOMEN'S EQuITY IN EMPLOYMENT AcT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 19-20. The House Report gave the following example:
A federal judge found that Nancy Ezold was denied partnership due to inten-
tional sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr
and Solis-Cohen, [751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990)]. But the discriminatory de-
nial of partnership she suffered, as well as the firm's attacks on her skills and
credibility after she sought to enforce her Title VII rights, may have permanently
damaged her career. Many women and minorities encounter the glass ceiling in
the course of their careers, but choose not to seek to enforce their civil rights
because of these very risks.
But see Ezold, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (reversing the
trial court and entering judgment in favor of the law firm and against Ms. Ezold).
In addition, on August 11, 1992, the U.S. Department of Labor released Pipelines of
Progress, a report that described the status of the OFCCP Glass Ceiling Initiative by indi-
cating that "although women and minorities have made progress in the workplace, much
still needs to be done to change attitudes, perceptions and biases which hold them back
from corporate advancement." Alvarez, supra note 9, at 203.
88. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Law firms have tried to develop their
own solutions to the glass ceiling problem, but these solutions may do more harm than
good. For example, some law firms have allowed women attorneys to be on a less demand-
ing "mommy track" to assist with their desire to have more time with their children. Yet,
commentators have said that this may perpetuate the perception that women are unable to
handle the full responsibilities of partnership. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 44, at 843-45.
89. Thom Weidlich & Charise K. Lawrence, Sex and the Firms: A Progress Report,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1. Twenty-seven percent of the women surveyed were part-
ners. The survey of male and female law firm partners and associates revealed that nearly
six in ten women lawyers think the glass ceiling has either remained intact or become even
more impenetrable during the past three years. The survey found that "women still feel
that firms are giving them fewer opportunities than men to meet potential clients; that the
glass ceiling is still in place, especially for management positions; and that men still have
more leeway in making personal and career decisions." Id. at 22. Nearly one-third of the
women attorneys said that they have been passed over for an assignment because of their
sex. Fifty-one percent of the women said that they had experienced sexual harassment on
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The only optimistic note in these recent surveys is the increasing
number of law firms adopting written policies against sexual harass-
ment and disciplining harassers.90 These firms appear concerned
about the potential financial exposure that a successful Title VII sex
discrimination claim may bring.91 However, women partners are in a
particularly difficult situation because they are not protected by Title
VII.
H. The Title VII Gap
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have ruled that Title VII does not protect bona fide
partners from discrimination. 92 These decisions rely on the text of Ti-
tle VII. However, U.S. Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
the job. Id. See also Rutledge supra note 12, at 31 (more women partners than male
partners are unhappy with their careers).
90. The National Law Journal survey revealed that 73% of the responding lawyers
were at law firms with anti-harassment policies as compared to 38% four years earlier.
Weidlich, supra note 89, at 22. A New York Times article details how law firms are reigning
in harassers. Slade, supra note 11. One woman attorney stated, however, that a law firm's
written sexual harassment policy was not necessarily enough because she would be
blackballed if she ever complained about the actions of her firm's major "money earner."
fI
91. The New York Times reports that concern over large discrimination claims is re-
sponsible because "[l]awyers who have defended firms or their partners against harassment
suits say the cost of litigating, win or lose, easily exceeds half a million dollars. In the event
of defeat, tack on a jury award that will amount to many thousands more." Slade, supra
note 11. This is no idle concern. See Jane Gross, Jury Awards $7.1 Million in Sex Case-
Legal Secretary Gets Punitive Damages, N.Y. TiMiEs, Sept. 2, 1994, at A16 (reporting Rena
Weeks's victorious sexual harassment case against Baker & McKenzie based on the firm's
failure to stop a partner's actions). The availability of increased damages in these cases
because of statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has caused defense lawyers to
adopt harsher tactics. See Ellen Schultz & Juda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy - Plaintiffs' Sex
Lives are Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al.
There are more women at law firms than ever before and the "events of the last few
years, from the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings to a number of highly publicized
suits against partners of leading law firms, have underscored the costliness, whether polit-
ical or financial, of the sex harassment battlefield." Slade, supra note 11. Moreover, some
evidence suggests that lawyers are more willing to sue their law firms than ever before.
Tamminen, supra note 15, at 41.
92. Auld v. Law Offices of Cooper, Beckman and Therck, No. 92-1356, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 32939, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 18,1992) (traditional partners are not "employees"
of the firm for purposes of Title VII); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th
Cir. 1991); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987) (refers to "bona fide general partners"); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs.,
794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Title VII does not apply to shareholders).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
peals decisions support the idea that partners have an implied
common-law duty not to discriminate against other partners. 93
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or to
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of that individ-
ual's sex.94 Title VII defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees
for each working day."'95 It defines a "person" as "one or more ...
partnerships, associations or corporations. ' 96 Thus, partners are em-
ployers under Title VII and undeserving of its protection.97
The U.S. Supreme Court's only discussion of whether Title VII
protects partners supports the federal appellate court decisions. In
Hishon v. King & Spalding, Justice Powell stated in his concurring
opinion:
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's opinion
should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of a
law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the Court's opinion does
not require that the relationship among partners be characterized as
an "employment" relationship to which Title VII would apply. The
relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between
... the partnership and its associates. 98
The only exception to this rule is when the partner functions as an
associate or employee. In Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., the Elev-
enth Circuit defined what it meant by partner: "[W]e focus not on any
label, but on the actual role played by the claimant in the operations
of the involved entity and the extent to which that role dealt with
traditional concepts of management, control, and ownership." 99 Jus-
tice Powell stated in Hishon that, "[o]f course, an employer may not
evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as
93. See infra notes 106, 109.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). See also Note, supra note 20, at 285.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
97. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987) ("Use of 'employee' instead of a broader designation provides its own exclusion of
bona fide general partners."); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (adopt-
ing this reasoning).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has not directly contradicted this
reasoning. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 265 (discussing EEOC agency documents regarding
whether partners are covered by Title VII and concluding that the EEOC papers are "so
scanty and open to argument in almost every respect that they fall short of agency interpre-
tation which guides us").
98. 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J. concurring).
99. 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 1991).
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'partners."' "u ° However, few federal courts have rejected a partner's
label.101 Thus, Title VII does not protect bona fide partners. 0 2
On the other hand, Hishon and two other cases support implying
a common-law duty for partners not to discriminate. In Hishon, the
Court ruled that Title VII prevents a law firm from discriminating
against a woman associate on the basis of her gender in the partner-
ship selection process. 03 The Court ruled that this constituted dis-
crimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of her
employment.' °4 The Court also stated that certain contracts may "af-
ford a basis for an implied condition that the ultimate decision would
be fairly made on the merits"' 05 -i.e., on a non-discriminatory basis.
In United States v. Burke, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
damages awarded in a Title VII employment discrimination lawsuit
were taxable because they were not meant to compensate for a per-
sonal injury, but instead represented lost job benefits similar to back
wages.' 0 6 In concurrence, Justice Souter also rejected the personal in-
jury analogy because of the "similarity between Title VII and contract
law, at least in the context of an existing employment relationship...
[given the] great resemblance of rights guaranteed by Title VII to
100. 467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
101. For example, the partner label was not overridden in any of the cases listed supra
note 92. See also Howard McCoach, Note, Applying Title VII to Partners: One Step Be-
yond, 20 RurrERs L.J. 741, 768 (1989) (no discrimination case has allowed a bona fide
partner the statute's protection). But see Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 672-73 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (regional "partners" possessing no equity in the firm are at-will employees within the
meaning of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
717 F. Supp. 218, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (if a partner's or principal's duties closely resemble
those of a salaried employee, title alone will not defeat an ADEA claim).
102. Justice Powell stated that bona fide partners are typically involved in a wide range
of decisions:
These decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and other types of
compensation; work assignments; approval of commitments in bar association,
civic or political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new clients; ques-
tions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; and expansion policies. Such
decisions may affect each partner of the firm.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78.
104. Id. at 77. The Court also referred to the employment contract between the firm
and the associate as being the source of these terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment. Id. at 74.
105. Id. at 74-75 n.6.
106. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1874 (1992). But see Jody R. King, Com-
ment, A Case Frozen in Time: Does Title VII's 1991 Amendment Strip United States v.
Burke of Its Precedential Value, 28 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 109, 128 (1993) (suggesting that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991's addition of compensatory and punitive damage remedies to Title
VII makes Title VII more tort-like). Nonetheless, the Comment does not conclude that
Justice Souter's reasoning has been rejected.
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those commonly arising under the terms and conditions of an employ-
ment contract."' 0 7 He further stated that "Title VII's ban on discrimi-
nation is easily envisioned as a contractual term implied by law.' 10 8
Finally, in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,10 9 the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed a district court's promotion remedy on behalf of
another professional woman who sued her accounting firm under Title
VII for sex discrimination because of its refusal to make her a partner.
Hopkins appears to be the first Title VII case in which a court ordered
a plaintiff made a partner as relief."10 The court also indicated that
further relief would be available if the plaintiff was subjected to une-
qual terms after becoming a partner or if she was retaliated against for
bringing a Title VII claim."' Thus, the Hopkins court implied that
Title VII does not give partners carte blanche to discriminate against
women associates as soon as they make partner."12
107. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1877-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 1878 (emphasis added). "A strong argument can be made that the rights
guaranteed by Title VII are implied terms of every employment contract...." Charles A.
Shanor & Samuel A. Marcosson, Battleground for a Divided Court: Employment Discrimi-
nation in the Supreme Court, 1988-89, 6 LAB. LAW 145, 174 n.118 (1990). See also Robert
Charles Johnson, Comment, Partnership and Title VII Remedies: Price-Waterhouse Cracks
the Glass Ceiling, 1991 Wisc. L. REV. 787, 803 (Title VII's prohibition on discrimination
adds implied terms to the traditional at-will employment agreement).
109. 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Hopkins is the continuation of a Supreme Court
case that outlined the burdens of proof in mixed motive Title VII discrimination cases. See
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
110. See also Masterson v. LaBrum & Doak, 846 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Prior
to Hopkins and Masterson, scholars had suggested that courts were ill-suited to make a
business judgment as to whether a professional should be made a partner. See, e.g., JOEL
FRIEDMAN & GEORGE STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 683 (3d
ed. 1993) ("[Rlequests for court-awarded tenure and partnership have proved particularly
troublesome to courts."); but cf. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982) (there is no legal basis for distinguishing be-
tween upper and lower-level selection method). One court denied reinstatement to a high-
level advertising executive because of concern about the hostility between her and the
firm. EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 559
F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
111. Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 978 n.10. For a lengthy analysis of Hopkins's remedy, see
Chervin, supra note 68, at 212.
112. The legislative history of Title VII suggests that its failure to protect partners from
discrimination was not a deliberate exclusion. Instead, it reflects a failure to address the
issue and a simple adoption of language used in most other federal statutes. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 20, at 285 (explaining that Title VII adopted the same general definition of
"employee" used in other federal statutes); Horst, supra note 58, at 850 (pointing out that
Congress did not exempt businesses that employ professionals from having to comply with
Title VII); id. at 852-61 (arguing that court's interpretation of the term employee in Title
VII is inconsistent with the intent of Congress). Cf. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77 n.10 (excerpts
from Title VII legislative history do not show that partnerships are free to discriminate
against their employees in partnership decisions). Title VII's failure to protect partners
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In sum, Title VII does not protect partners. But the Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit have left a door open for courts to find
that partners have an implied contractual duty not to discriminate
against each other.
HI. The Duty to Act in Good Faith Among Partners
In his 1841 Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, Justice Story
said that "good faith, reasonable skill and diligence, and the exercise
of sound judgment and discretion, are naturally, if not necessarily, im-
plied from the very nature and character of the relation of partner-
ship."1" 3  Justice Story's view of partnerships as essentially
contractual 1 4 can be traced to Roman partnership law." 5 This Sec-
tion describes the characteristics of modem professional partnerships
and explains the basis for a partner's duty to act in good faith.
A. The Partnership Organization
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower,1 6 the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that a partnership exists "when persons join
together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying
on a trade, profession, or business and when there is community of
interest in the profits and losses.""17 Section 6(1) of the Uniform Part-
from discrimination is therefore unlike the deliberate exclusion of companies with less than
15 employees from the statute's coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
This omission is understandable since there were almost no minority or women partners
when Title VII was passed. See HARRINOTON, supra note 7, at 18 ("The profession was so
overwhelmingly male that there was little pressure and certainly little inclination on the
part of professional leaders to think about how women would fit.").
113. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 169, at 289
(1881).
114. 1 REED RoWLEY, RowLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 18(g), at 499 (2d ed. 1960) ("Part-
nership being a relation of trust, confidence and mutual agency, it follows that it must be
founded on contract .... "). See infra note 128.
115. Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Pol-
icy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 825, 852 (1990). Justice Story summarized his under-
standing of the good faith principle in Roman partnership law: "'[I]n cases of partnership
the same diligence is ordinarily required of each partner, as reasonable and prudent men
generally employ about the like business; unless the circumstances of the particular case
repel such a conclusion."' Id. (quoting STORY, supra note 113, at 263). Under Roman law,
the good faith requirement bound the contracting parties to the contract's explicit terms
and also to "all the terms that were naturally implied in their agreement." E. Allan Farns-
worth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) (quoting FREDERICK LAWSON, A
COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 124-25 (1955)).
116. 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946).
117. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has described partnerships by
saying:
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nership Act [hereinafter "the U.P.A."] defines a partnership as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners [of] a
business for profit. 11 8 Partnerships have tax advantages for profes-
sionals over the corporate form."19 Partners also generally have secur-
ity since "[a] partnership relationship is typically intended to operate
over a long term.' 120
Unlike shareholders and directors in corporations who are typi-
cally shielded from liability by the corporate form, partners are per-
sonally liable for the acts of their colleagues.' 2 ' Partners also
generally make capital contributions to the firm, which increases their
personal exposure.' 22 The major protection that partners have against
these financial risks is the fiduciary duty that all partners owe one
another. 23 However, scholars disagree over whether fiduciary duties
are fundamentally contractual. 24
Despite some differences in partnership law between states, the general indicia of
partners and partnership are very similar across state lines. The U[niform]
P[artnership] A[ct] sets forth, among others, the following characteristics of a
partner: (1) unlimited liability (§ 15); (2) the right to share in profits and partici-
pate in management subject to agreement between partners (§ 18(a), (e)); (3) the
right and duty to act as an agent of the other partners (§ 9); and (4) shared owner-
ship (§ 6).
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 267 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987).
118. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1914). The U.P.A. was promul-
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1914. Ar-
nold M. Wensinger, Note, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup Provisions:
Stability or Headache?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 905 (1993). Forty-nine states adopted the
U.P.A. Id. at 905. However, in 1992, the Commissioners promulgated a Revised Uniform
Partnership Act (R.U.P.A.), 6 U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 1993). Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523,
577 n.237 (1993). Professor Vestal notes that Texas, Wyoming, and Montana have already
adopted versions of the R.U.P.A. Id. at 577 n.237.
119. 1 ALLAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSrEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP, § 1.03(9), at 1:34-35 (3d ed. 1994); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partner-
ship Freeze-Outs, 40 MERCER L. REV. 535, 536 n.4 (1989).
120. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:11. See also Wheeler v.
Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987).
121. 1 BROMBERO & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:2; Claire Moore Dickerson,
Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 149 (1993).
122. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 2.07, at 2:71.
123. Dickerson, supra note 121, at 154.
124. For the contractual view, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993). But cf. Vestal, supra note 118. For a more
balanced analysis tending toward a noncontractual view, see Dickerson, supra note 121, at
115. Professor Dickerson does an excellent job of describing the various schools of
thought.
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Partnerships are more egalitarian than other business organiza-
tions125 in that partners have equal rights in the management and con-
duct of their affairs.126 Professor Bromberg, in his treatise on
partnerships [hereinafter "Bromberg and Ribstein"], states that a
partner cannot be excluded from participating in management unless
the agreement is "explicit and .unambiguous ... because a partner's
right to participate in management is such an important protection
from the co-partner's abuse of power."' 27
Partnerships are governed by many areas of law, such as trusts
and agency, but "[flundamentally, general partnership is a contractual
relationship among the partners."' 28 This means that "[i]f an explicit
125. Dickerson, supra note 121, at 150 ("Partners, but not shareholders-are managers
as well as owners. Partners, unlike shareholders, cannot freely transfer all of their owner-
ship ights.... Partnerships tend to be smaller businesses than are corporations.").
126. The U.P.A. also states that partners must render "on demand" full information
concerning partnership affairs and-that a partner may rightfully contravefie the partnership
agreement only with the consent of all partners. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr §§ 18(h) & 20, 6
U.L.A. 213-58 (1914).
This egalitarian view of partnerships is even true for large partnerships. See, e.g.,
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987)("[L]arge partnerships may operate more democratically overall than small partner-
ships, which are frequently vulnerable to domination by a single partner or a small group
of partners."). The court in Wheeler said that the underlying assumption of a true general'
partnership is akin to the image of an egalitarian "New England town meeting." Id.
127. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 6.03, at 6:41. See also Wilzig v. Sis-
selman, 442 A.2d 1021, 1030 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) ("Management rights are
extremely important since partners are generally liable jointly for all obligations arising
from the conduct of partnership business."); Heyman v. Heyman, 71 N.E. 591, 597 (Ill.
1904)(quoting 22 AM. & ENG. ENCYCL OF LAW 210 (2d ed.) ("'Excluding a partner from
any voice in the management of the business, and [showing] disregard of his advice and
wishes"' should result in dissolution of the partnership.).
128. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:11. See also Dickerson,
supra note 121, at 152 ([T~he partnership is "a form that is substantially contractual any-
way."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 124, at 438 ("Good faith in contract merges into
fiduciary duties, with a blur and not a line."); ROWLEY, supra note 114, at 499. But see
Vestal, supra note 118 (rejecting the contractarian view of partnership and reasoning that
the fiduciary relation between partners is the foundation of partnerships and of the
U.P.A.).
Vestal's anti-contractarian view is undermined by the case law and commentary
describing the U.P.A. as a gap-filler that only applies when the partnership agreement does
not speak to an issue. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership
Cases, 15 OKRA. Crry U. L. REv. 753, 765 (1990) ("Also, since the provisions of the Uni-
form Partnership Act are default provisions which apply in the absence of a contrary
agreement, they should reflect legitimate expectations of the parties."). Thus, § 18 of the
U.P.A., for example, prescribes the rights and duties of partners inter se "subject to any
agreement between them." 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914). This means that the contractual agree-
ment generally controls. See, e.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1028 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) ("In any determination of the relations of partners inter se,
the primary reference is to the terms of the partnership agreement .... "). This is further
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[partnership] agreement does exist, it governs most aspects of the par-
ties' relationship, since many of the provisions of the Uniform Part-
nership Act are subject to the parties' agreements. Thus, the
agreement is the law of the partnership .... )9129
The U.P.A. is a set of default rules, adopted by 49 states, that
governs areas in which the partnership agreement may be silent. 130
The U.P.A. expulsion provisions are based on an aggregate theory of
partnership which assumes that a partnership is no more than the col-
lection of partners who compose it. 13 1 Under the aggregate theory, a
partnership "dissolves" when one partner leaves or is expelled since
the previous aggregate of partners no longer exists. 132 By contrast,
corporations exist as entities separate and apart from their sharehold-
ers and directors. A Revised Uniform Partnership Act [hereinafter
"the R.U.P.A."] has recently been adopted that moves toward an en-
tity approach. 33 Finally, a state's common law of partnerships may
also supplement a partner's obligation if the agreement and the
U.P.A. do not speak to the issue. 34
evidenced by the fact that most routine, day-to-day partnership affairs are conducted pur-
suant to the partnership agreement and in accord with other rules adopted by the partner-
ship that are contractual in nature. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 103, 6 U.L.A. 231
(Supp. 1993).
However, Vestal is correct in emphasizing the contractual nonwaivability of the fiduci-
ary duties that partners owe to one another. See infra note 148. Indeed, the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act takes a contractual approach to partnerships while also making the
fiduciary and good faith duties that partners owe to one another mandatory. REV. UNiF.
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. 231 (Supp. 1993). After all, a partnership without
fiduciary obligations would be a business association, not a partnership. See Peterson v.
Eppler, 67 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ("The parties cannot by using the word 'part-
nership' create such a relationship when ... there was to be no community of interest in
the business as such and no right to participate in the management of the business.");
Dickerson, supra note 121, at 155 ("The word 'partner' carries a connotation of social
intimacy not found in 'shareholder.' The emphasis is on trust in its non-technical sense.").
129. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 2.05, at 2:42.
130. See Weidner, supra note 115, at 828; Beveridge, supra note 128, at 765. Professor
Weidner was the Reporter for the R.U.P.A.
131. See Wensinger, supra note 118, at 908-09 n.30.
132. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.03(c)(6), at 1:29. Most firms insert
language in their partnership agreements that permit the firm to continue operating de-
spite such a membership change. See Hillman, supra note 79, at 33-35. These clauses are
probably ineffective. Id. at 34-35. However, their frequency probably reflects the fact that
partnerships see themselves as business entities despite the fact that the law sees them as
an aggregate. Id. at 35-38.
133. Weidner, supra note 115, at 829. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 201, 6 U.L.A.
236 (Supp. 1993).
134. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:10-12 (partnership law is
supplemented by the law of agency, property, trusts, and especially contract interpreta-
tion). Section 5 of the U.P.A. states that the rules of law and equity govern gaps in the
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B. The Contractual Roots of the Good Faith Duty
Section 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that
every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and thirty eight states have adopted this position. 135 This ap-
plies to the contractual relation known as a partnership. This Section
describes the history of the implied good faith doctrine and its applica-
tion to partnerships.
One of the first American contract cases relying on the covenant
was Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 36 in which Justice Cardozo
stated that a contract to pay profits pursuant to an exclusive agency
agreement implicitly included "a promise to use reasonable efforts to
bring profits and revenues into existence."' 37 The doctrine saw little
use again until the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was promul-
gated in the middle of this century. 38
statute. UNrF. PARTNERsHI ACT § 5, 6 U.L.A. 19 (1914). See also Susan J. Swinson, Note,
Partner v. Partner: Actions at Law for Wrongdoing in a Partnership, 9 GA. ST. U. L. Rlv.
905, 920 (1993).
135. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988) (the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract "has been recognized in the
majority of American jurisdictions, the Restatement and the Uniform Commercial
Code."); Karen L. Hunt, From Getting Hired to Getting Fired: Employment Law in Tran-
sition, JUDGES' J., Fall 1992, at 4, 9 (38 states have adopted the Second Restatement posi-
tion). For examples of state courts applying this rule, see Milstein v. Security Pacific Nat'l
Bank, 103 Cal. Rptr. 16,17-18 (1972) (applying implied covenant to construction of deed of
trust); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 1958) ("Every con-
tract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it. .. ."); Kirke LaShelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 166 (N.Y. 1933) ("respondent assumed a fiduci-
ary relationship which had its origins in the contract and which imposed upon them the
duty of utmost good faith"). See also Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Com-
mon Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 404 (1980) (listing addi-
tional cases).
136. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
137. Id. at 215.
138. Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (1992)
(quoting E. Allen Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cmi. L. REv. 666, 667 (1963)). The Uniform
Commercial Code was promulgated in 1951, and was first enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953.
SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 18 (West 1994). One of the few pre-U.C.C. cases using
the doctrine was Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941):
When we turn to the precedents we are met at once with the confusion of state-
ment whether a covenant can be implied only if it was clearly "intended" by the
parties, or whether such a covenant can rest on principles of equity.... One may
perhaps conclude that in large measure this confusion arises out of the reluctance
of courts to admit that they were to a considerable extent "remaking" a contract
in situations where it seemed necessary and appropriate so to do.
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The U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned."'1 39 The U.C.C. also refers to a "good
faith purchaser" in numerous sections. 140 The commentary to section
1-203 of the U.C.C. notes that good faith requires "observance by the
merchant of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." 4 Professor E. Allan Farnsworth suggests that this "inquiry
goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or en-
forcement.' 42 Many courts began to use the implied good faith doc-
trine in commercial cases following promulgation of the U.C.C. 143
The First Restatement of Contracts did not impose an implied
good faith obligation on contracting parties. However, the subsequent
adoption of the good faith doctrine within the U.C.C. provided the
momentum for its eventual inclusion in the Second Restatement. Sec-
tion 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, adopted in 1981,
recognizes this good faith obligation.144
The commentary to section 205 of the Second Restatement pro-
vides examples of prohibited conduct:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in per-
formance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified.
But the obligation goes further; bad faith may be overt or may con-
sist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. A
complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the fol-
lowing types are among those which have been recognized in judi-
cial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence
and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to coop-
erate in the other party's performance. 45
139. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990).
140. The U.C.C. refers to a "good faith purchaser" in §§ 2-403, 2-507,2-702,2-706, 2A-
305, 5-108, 6-101, 7-209, 7-301, 7-403, 7-503, 7-504, 8-311, 8-315, and 9-504.
141. U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1987).
142. Farnsworth, supra note 115, at 668.
143. Lillard, supra note 138, at 1233.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). See also Robert S. Sum-
mers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 810 (1982); see supra note 135.
145. The covenant has been used frequently in cases involving franchise termination
disputes and cases involving an insurance company's failure to pay. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d, illus. 3 (based on a bad faith failure to settle by an
insurance company in Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914)); Ernest
Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967
DUKE L.J. 465, 495. It has been applied in those cases to prohibit one party with discretion
over another from exercising that discretion arbitrarily. See infra note 230. It also applies
when one party interferes with a condition precedent to contract performance. Bane v.
Ferguson, 707 F. Supp. 988, 994 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 890 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1989); Golden Bear
Family Restaurants v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581, 588 (II1. App. Ct. 1986).
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Many courts have also held that the implied covenant of good
faith prohibits abusive acts of discretion by the partners who control
the firm.146 This implied contract doctrine dovetails with the rela-
tional view of business contracts 'that courts have increasingly em-
braced-a non-formalistic view applicable to partnerships. 147
Moreover, this duty cannot be waived even by agreement of the
parties.148
146. See Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. Nev. 1993)(citing K
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987)) (stating that the implied good
faith covenant requires "a special relationship in which special reliance, trust and depen-
dency is part. The special relationship required is one of particular reliance as found in
insurance, partnership, and franchise agreements.... ."); Amos v. Union Oil Co., 663 F.
Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1987) (oil company and gasoline dealers); Friedman v. Colo. Nat'l
Bank, 825 P.2d 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), modified, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993). See also
Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 549-58 (discussing how the duty of good faith and fair dealing
that arises in all contracts may limit the discretion of partners).
147. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classica4 Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 895
(1978). The relational view emphasizes how the continuing business contacts between par-
ties essentially establish and modify any formal contract terms by creating new and effec-
tive implied expectations. Id. at 889 ("Processes for flexibility and change in contractual
relation"). Bromberg and Ribstein find this relational analysis important to an under-
standing of partnership law:
A partnership relationship is typically intended to operate over a long term.
Since the partners cannot foresee all events that may arise during the course of
the relationship, they have opted to be governed by a set of fiduciary rules that
serves to fill in the gaps in their agreement. In this sense, the agreement among
the partners lends itself to a "relational" analysis that attempts to sustain the par-
ties' relationship and that does not view the initial agreement as the sole source of
rules governing the relationship throughout its duration.
1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:11 (footnotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (under Massachusetts law,
a contract providing that "'[g]eneral [p]artners shall not be prevented from engaging in
other activities for profit, whether in research and development or otherwise, and whether
or not competitive with the business of the partnership' did not allow partner to buy
another investor's interest in a connected corporation); Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v.
Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 1989) (a contract
allowing partners to compete with the partnership did not legitimate a partner's exploita-
tion of secret information against the partnership, including his awareness that the partner-
ship could not close the deal right away, or his deceiving the seller into believing that the
partnership thought that the property was too expensive); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d
304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("Defendants cite no authority, and we find none, for the proposi-
tion that there can be an a priori waiver of fiduciary duties in a partnership-be it general
or limited."); Appletree Square I v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889,893 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (partners are permitted to vary certain aspects of their relationship but not its fiduci-
ary character); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 184, at 268 (1979) ("[P]artners are free to vary
many aspects of their relationship inter se, but they are not free to destroy its fiduciary
character."); id. § 181, at 262 ("This is very obvious because these rights are so fundamen-
tal to fair play and the basic concept of a partnership .... "); Dickerson, supra note 121, at
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C. The Fiduciary Roots of the Good Faith Duty
The fiduciary nature of the partnership relationship further
strengthens the good faith obligations between partners.149 Justice
Cardozo provided a famous description of these fiduciary duties in
Meinhard v. Salmon:' 50
[C]o partners, owe to one another.., the duty of the finest loyalty.
Many forms of conduct, permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompro-
mising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti-
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by anyjudgment of this court.
Professor Bromberg interprets a partner's fiduciary duties as re-
quiring the partner to act with the "utmost good faith, fairness, and
loyalty" toward other partners.' 5 ' Further, Professor Norwood Bever-
133; Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 579 (court should find that a partnership agreement that
permits a partner to be expelled without cause is unenforceable as against public policy); J.
Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest Draft
of R. U.P.A., 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 727, 749-50 (1991) ("The doctrine of unconscionability
would be the most likely vehicle for upsetting such a clause .... ); G. Richard Shell,
Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431, 442 n.48 (1993) ("Were a
commercial party to attempt to contract out of the duty of good faith ... a court would
simply refuse to enforce the offending term and impose the duty of good faith anyway.");
id. at 523 (an implied duty of good faith is an "immutable rule"). But see Gelder Medical
Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (N.Y. 1977) (partnership agreement permitting
expulsion without cause or good faith was enforced).
149. Professor Dickerson has explained the difference between the contractual duty of
good faith and the fiduciary duty of good faith:
The obligation for contracting parties to act in good faith does not fit the
classic mold of a fiduciary duty because a person can clearly be subject to a con-
tract law requirement of good faith without being a fiduciary. Further, the re-
quirement of good faith may coexist with self-interest, and need not contain the
dependency feature of fiduciary duties, as described in the prior section. Even if
an obligation clearly has arisen out of a relationship between fiduciary and bene-
ficiary, the former could act in a self-interested way without breaching the con-
tract law requirement of good faith.
Dickerson, supra note 121, at 119. See also Weidner & Larson, supra note 29, at 24 ("The
'good faith' requirement draws upon both the fiduciary law of cooperative relationships
and the contract law of adversarial relationships" in the partnership context.).
150. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
151. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 6.07, at 6:68. As one court said, "The
fiduciary relation prohibits all forms of trickery, secret dealings and preference of self in
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idge says that the fiduciary obligation encompasses the duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith.152 These fiduciary duties are similar to the
ones that directors and officers in a close corporation owe to the
shareholders. 153
The R.U.P.A. expressly requires partners to act in good faith to-
ward one another, although it does not characterize this as a fiduciary
duty.154 Section 404(d) of the R.U.P.A. says:
matters relating to and connected with a partnership and joint venture." Bakalis v. Bress-
ler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ill. 1953).
152. See Beveridge, supra note 128, at 755-56 (quoting J. Story's Commentaries, supra
note 113, regarding the good faith obligations of partners). Professor Beveridge describes
the duty of care as part of the duty of loyalty dictating the particular level of care with
which a partner must act to avert liability, e.g., negligence, gross negligence, etc. Id. at 753-
55.
The relationship between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care is discussed by Pro-
fessor Geoffrey Hazard in his Foreword to A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations ix (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1986):
[B]oth analytically and normatively the principle of loyalty precedes that of due
care. Analytically, the principle of loyalty has primacy in that the duty of care
entails the principle of loyalty. As stated in § 4.01(a) of Tentative Draft No. 4, the
conduct of an officer or director conforms to the duty of care when it is "in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion .... ." Normatively, the principle of loyalty to the corporation specifies the
direction in which the efforts are to be made that are regulated by the due care
requirement.
Id. (emphasis added). Professor Dickerson offers a slightly different view:
In their simplest forms, the duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary place the
interests of the beneficiary ahead of the fiduciary's own, and the duty of care
imposes a prudent person standard on the fiduciary. Good faith, in this context,
is an element of the fiduciary's duties of loyalty and care, but not a wholly sepa-
rate fiduciary duty. The degree of the standard of good faith is part of the contin-
uing debate, but classically it has meant more than arm's length good faith when
applied to a fiduciary.
Dickerson, supra note 121, at 111 n.2.
153. 1 BROMBERG & RmSTEn, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:4-5 ("Many of the features
of partnership under the U.P.A. are best suited to closely held businesses .... [B]ecause
general partnership provides a well-developed model for closely held businesses, partner-
ship precedents may be particularly influential in cases involving closely held corpora-
tions."). Partnerships are more like close corporations because neither is publicly owned
and because fiduciary duties control the leaders in both businesses. 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL
& ROBERT B. THOMPsON, O'NEAS'S OPPRESSION OF MINORrrY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.06, at
37-52 (2d ed. 1985) (chapter entitled "Eliminating Minority Shareholders From Director-
ate and Excluding Them From Company Employment"); David A. Kendrick, Comment,
The Strict Good Faith Standard-Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close Cor-
porations, 33 MERCER L. REv. 595 (1982).
154. The U.P.A. contains no explicit references to a partner's duty of good faith and is
thus less explicit than the R.U.P.A. The U.P.A. does refer to fiduciary obligations and
these obligations impliedly include a duty to act in good faith. Section 21(1) of the U.P.A.,
entitled "Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary," says:
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A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners under this [Revised Act] or under the partnership
agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. The obligation of good faith and fair
dealing may not be eliminated by agreement, but the partners by
agreement may determine the standards by which the performance
of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable. 155
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners
from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258 (1914). Section 18 of the U.P.A. specifies
other "Rights and Duties of Partners." Id. at § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914). These provisions
essentially require all partners to deal with one another's finances fairly and to permit all
partners to participate equally in the management and conduct of the business. Section 20
of the U.P.A. also establishes certain duties by partners to freely disclose material informa-
tion to other partners. Id. at § 20, 6 U.L.A. 256 (1914). See also infra text accompanying
note 165 (discussing good faith requirements regarding expulsion).
155. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 254 (Supp. 1993). Professor
Vestal argues that the R.U.P.A. destroys the fiduciary duties that have traditionally bound
partners under the common law and the U.P.A. Vestal, supra note 118, at 550-51. He
asserts that the R.U.P.A. takes a contractual approach to partnership and does not clearly
recognize its fiduciary character. Id. at 550. He also argues that the fiduciary duties set
forth in the R.U.P.A. are weakened because partners may limit their scope. Id. at 534.
Furthermore, Vestal argues that R.U.P.A. provisions permitting partners to act in their
own self-interest negate significant fiduciary obligations. Id. at 553-55.
Vestal's concerns are exaggerated. Professor Weidner, the Reporter for the R.U.P.A.,
has stated that its duty of good faith goes beyond a contractual duty. Weidner & Larson,
supra note 29, at 25 n.149 ("Because R.U.P.A. assumes cooperative rather than adversarial
relationships, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing presumably will be given a more
powerful reading in the partnership context.") & n.149 (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Elec-
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), requiring partners to act in accord with a "strict
good faith standard" as an example of the scope of the R.U.P.A.'s good faith duties). Pro-
fessor Ribstein has even criticized the R.U.P.A. for taking too broad a view of fiduciary
duties. Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready For Prime
Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 55-57 (1993). This suggests that Professor Weidner's perspective
on the R.U.P.A.'s duty of good faith, located somewhere between Vestal and Ribstein, is
probably correct.
Professor Dickerson has shown that the duty of good faith between partners has not
historically been considered a separate fiduciary duty. She writes: "Historically, although
the duties of loyalty and care are reflected in the U.P.A. and its case law gloss, the so-
called duty of good faith and fair dealing appears not to have been separately articulated.
Good faith, instead, has been an integral aspect of the duties of loyalty and care." Dicker-
son, supra note 121, at 111, 115 n.18. Thus, the R.U.P.A.'s failure to list the duty of good
faith as a separate fiduciary duty accurately reflects the common-law tradition that Vestal
acknowledges is at the root of the U.P.A. . Vestal, supra note 118, at 526-27.
Professor Vestal's argument that partners can agree to negate the duty of good faith
ignores the fact that the R.U.P.A. makes the duty mandatory, unlike the U.P.A. that said
nothing explicit about the subject. See Vestal supra note 118, at 552. R.U.P.A. § 404 spe-
cifically prohibits partners from authorizing actions that are "manifestly unreasonable."
REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 404, 6 U.L.A. 254 (Supp. 1993). Professor Ribstein even
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The R.U.P.A. duty of good faith is mandatory.156 Moreover, sec-
tion 405 of the R.U.P.A. greatly expands the legal remedies available
to partners against other partners.157 Thus, courts impose good faith
obligations on partners based on the contractual roots of the partner-
ship, as well as its fiduciary nature.
IV. Good Faith and Partnership Expulsions
Although courts and scholars agree that partners must act in
good faith toward one another, they, disagree over whether this re-
recognizes that the R.U.P.A.'s "[m]andatory fiduciary duties change decades of prior law
under the U.P.A." Ribstein, Revised Uniform Partnership Act, supra at 57. See also Dick-
erson, supra note 121, at 143-45 (stating that partners must at a minimum not act "mani-
festly unreasonable"). The omission of this kind of language from the U.P.A. led a few
courts to conclude that fiduciary duties could be abrogated by agreement. See, e.g., Gelder
Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (N.Y. 1977) (enforcing a partnership
agreement permitting expulsion without cause or good faith). No court could render such
a ruling under the R.U.P.A. See also Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate
Revision of the Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 453-54 (1991) (the Reporter
for the R.U.P.A. explains that one important goal was to remove the ambiguities in the
U.P.A. given the fact that certain default rules were mandatory).
Vestal also ignores several other parts of the R.U.P.A. where good faith duties have
been strengthened. For example, the commentary to § 404 of the R.U.P.A. is entitled,
"R.U.P.A. contains an expanded and exclusive statement of the fiduciary duties of a part-
ner." 1 BROMBERG & RiBSEIN, supra note 119, app. at 127 (emphasis added). Moreover,
Vestal ignores R.U.P.A. § 405(b)'s huge expansion of remedies that permit partners to sue
the partnership at law. 6 U.L.A. 257 (Supp. 1993).
In addition, Professor Vestal's view of the U.P.A.'s duty of good faith may be too
rosey as courts often took a laissez-faire approach toward partnerships under the U.P.A.
See, e.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1028 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908
(1977) (suggesting that a partnership agreement can override U.P.A. provisions and com-
mon law); Ribstein, supra, at 56 ("Current law enforces the power to expel even without
proof that it was exercised for good cause or in accordance with particular procedures.");
id. at n.85 (listing cases).
Finally, the R.U.P.A.'s new provision regarding self-interested actions by partners is
not a great change from the U.P.A. Dickerson, supra note 121, at 118. All the new lan-
guage does is change "the burden of proof. A partner is, therefore, not automatically in-a
defensive posture merely because of the benefit derived from an act." Id. at 144. Indeed,
Professor Ribstein says that this part of the R.U.P.A. restricts the self-interest of partners
too much "by requiring partners to be 'nice' rather than merely to refrain from twisting the
contract in ways the parties never intended." Ribstein, supra.
Thus, Vestal's view that the R.U.P.A. substantially weakens the fiduciary duties of
partners is incorrect, especially since the R.U.P.A. makes the good faith duties of partners
mandatory and permits partners to bring actions at law.
156. See Dickerson, supra note 121, at 143 ("[T]his language renders unenforceable
any absolute blanket waiver of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.").
157. The new § 405(b) permits partners to sue other partners in courts of law, rather
than to be limited to filing an accounting action in a court of equity. RPv. UNIF. PARTNER-
sHip Acr § 405(b), 6 U.L.A. 257 (Supp. 1993).
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quirement extends to partnership expulsion decisions.158 This issue is
important because the most damaging discriminatory action that a
firm can take against a partner is to expel her or force her out.159 The
case law, the U.P.A. and R.U.P.A., several scholars, and public policy
all support imposing a good faith requirement on partnership
expulsions.
There are three basic expulsion clauses in partnership agree-
ments: "no cause" provisions, "for cause" provisions, and "silent"
provisions. 160 The silent provisions do not require the partnership to
have cause for expelling the partner, but they usually specify that a
vote of the partners must be taken. 161 The analysis in this Section
assumes that this most common type of agreement is in effect. 162
The leading case holding that partner expulsion decisions must be
in good faith is Page v. Page.163 In Page, Justice Traynor of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court said that a partner could not legally dissolve the
158. The reference to expulsion includes actual and constructive discharges, as well as
freeze-outs. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 536.
159. See, e.g., John Narducci, Note, The Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to
Shareholders of Professional Corporations: Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club,
55 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 839, 857-58 (1987) (arguing that shareholders who are "squeezed
out" of a professional corporation for discriminatory reasons should be able to sue for
breach of fiduciary duty). The present Article concentrates on expulsions because there is
some controversy over whether the good faith obligations of partners apply there. If the
good faith obligations apply there, they certainly cover discrimination in areas such as pro-
motions and case assignments because there is no dispute among scholars that good faith
obligations exist regarding the actual conduct of the partnership's business.
160. Hynes, supra note 148, at 742-50.
161. Id. at 742-49. Without such provisions, the partner could be removed at the whim
of a few controlling partners notwithstanding the capital contributions that the partner has
probably made to the firm. PAUL CARRINGTON & WILLIAM SUTHERLAND, THE ARTICLES
OF PARTNERSHIP FOR LAW FIRMS 47-48 (1961) (model partnership agreement require-
ments for expelling a partner), cited in Hillman, supra note 79, at 35-39).
162. The standard form partnership agreement has this percentage vote format and is
known as a "partnership at will." See, e.g., CARRINGTON & SUTHERLAND, supra note 161,
at 47-48; Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 539. Partnerships governed instead by a "for cause"
expulsion provision may not arbitrarily expel a partner. Hynes, supra note 148, at 742. An
expulsion may only be carried out under that type of provision if the partner has commit-
ted one of the acts that constitutes cause as defined in the agreement. A discriminatory
expulsion clearly would not constitute just cause. See, e.g., Robert Fitzpatrick, The Future
of Employment Discrimination Law as the United States of American Enters the 21st Cen-
tury, ALI-ABA Course of Study on Advanced Empl. Law and Litig., Dec. 2-4, 1993, at 13
("Obviously, race [discrimination] is not just cause. Nor is sex [discrimination].")
Moreover, the mandatory nature of the good faith duties means that a partnership
agreement that attempts to nullify those duties is ineffectual. See supra note 148. The rest
of this Article focuses on partnership agreements which say that an expulsion can occur by
a particular vote of the partnership.
163. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
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partnership "in bad faith" and violate "his fiduciary duties" because
this would negate the "implied agreement not to exclude [the other
partner] wrongfully from the partnership business opportunity."' 64
Professor Donald Weidner, the official reporter for the R.U.P.A., has
used the Page case to demonstrate the scope of the R.U.P.A.'s
mandatory duty of good faith.165 The Georgia Supreme Court fol-
lowed the reasoning of Page in Wilensky v. Blalock166 by holding that
a bad faith termination of a partnership violated Georgia law. 67
Several expulsion cases have involved law firms. In Rosenfeld,
Meyer & Susman v. Cohen,1 68 a California appellate court ruled that a
law firm partner could not maliciously dissolve a partnership because
partners "must exercise their rights in good faith, deal fairly with each
other and refrain from injuring the right of another party to receive
the benefits of an agreement or relationship.' 69 In Wieder v.
Skala,170 the New York Court of Appeals determined that a lawyer,
who was discharged from a firm for refusing to act unethically, could
maintain a complaint alleging that the firm acted in bad faith and
breached an implied condition of his employment. An Illinois court,
in denying a defense motion to dismiss, held that an implied covenant
of good faith restricted the power of the world's largest law firm,
Baker & McKenzie, to freeze out one of its female partners. 171
164. I& at 45. A later California Supreme Court decision involving a joint venture to
bid on a construction project affirmed this rule stating: "It is no less a violation of the trust
imposed between partners to permit the personal exploitation of that partnership informa-
tion and opportunity to the prejudice of one's former associates by the simple expedient of
withdrawal from the partnership." Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983).
165. Weidner & Larson, supra note 29, at 25 n.149.
166. 414 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1992).
167. Id. at 4. See also Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (two
majority partners in a three-man partnership at-will were allowed to purchase the partner-
ship assets when the exclusion of the minority partner was not done for wrongful purposes
and when the minority partner was not injured); Monteleone v. Monteleone, 497 N.E.2d
1221 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (analyzing who among the partners was at fault for wrongfully
dissolving the partnership and allowing the other partners to continue the business); Ball v.
Britton, 58 Tex. 57 (Tex. 1882) (defendant-partner had no right to expel plaintiff-partner
from the firm in an effort to take over its assets and plaintiff was entitled to damages
measured by the value of his services to the firm as well as punitive damages); Howell v.
Bowden, 368 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (awarding $57,500 in damages for partner
against co-partner for accounting and settlement of partnership and for co-partner's breach
of fiduciary duties); Sewell v. Connor, 23 S.W. 555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893)(rejecting defend-
ant's demurrer to suit by a partner after the partner was expelled).
168. 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 188 (Ct. App. 1983).
169. Id.
170. 609 N.E2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
171. Beall v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. at 10-11 (Cook Cty. Cir.
Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992).
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The U.P.A. and R.U.P.A. support this position. Section 31(1)(d)
of the U.P.A. states: "Dissolution is caused: ... (d) By the expulsion
of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with such a
power conferred by the agreement between the partners.' 72  A
"bona fide" expulsion must be legitimate-i.e., in good faith. 173 This
language highlights the fact that partner expulsion decisions are sub-
ject to the good faith requirement. 174 Moreover, as discussed, the
R.U.P.A. makes the good faith requirement mandatory. 175 In addi-
tion, the managing partner of a firm usually initiates terminations and
his actions are subject to the most stringent good faith standards. 7 6
Professor Gevurtz argues that when a partnership agreement
does not specify grounds for partner expulsion, it is "rational to as-
sume the parties intended an implicit requirement of reasonable
grounds for removal-rather than subject their interests completely to
the whims of other partners."'1 77 He explains that "[o]n balance, given
the danger of partners' abusing expulsion clauses to effect a freeze-
172. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(l)(d), 6 U.L.A. 376 (1914).
173. Hynes, supra note 148, at 740. Gevurtz has stated:
[I]t is reasonably clear that at least some good faith limit exists on expulsions.
Unlike the situation with dissolution at will, here the U.P.A. expressly provides
this result. Both sections 31(1)(d) and 38(2) speak of "bona fide" expulsions.
One part of the definition of bona fide is "in good faith."'
Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 580. The term "bona fide" is Latin for in good faith. See THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed., Houghton Mif-
flin Co. 1992).
174. As stated earlier, the partnership agreement cannot abrogate the duty of good
faith that partners owe to one another. See supra note 148.
175. See supra notes 148-150.
176. Bakalis v. Bressler, 115 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ill. 1953). The one-sided nature of the
negotiations over the terms of the partnership agreement further supports implying good
faith limitations on partner expulsions. Most attorneys who sign a partnership agreement
have little choice as to the terms of the agreement. It is a standard agreement governing all
of the partners. Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at A19, 21
("'The average partner at the average law firm has not read the firm's partnership agree-
ment. They don't even have to sign it."'); Cox, supra note 18 ("He signed the partnership
agreement reluctantly in his law firm's parking garage, then rushed to a management meet-
ing that had started without him.... [T]he surviving name partner told him the new agree-
ment was merely 'symbolic' and he should sign it to keep the others happy until something
better could be drafted.") These agreements have some of the characteristics of adhesion
contracts in that their terms are rarely negotiated and the attorney must sign or move
elsewhere. See generally Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(analyzing circumstances where adhesion contracts bar disclaimers of implied warranty of
merchantability). These adhesion-like qualities of partnership arrangements further sup-
port judicial imposition of implied good faith terms into the agreement. See Baker v. Rat-
zlaff, 564 P.2d 153, 157 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that statutory good faith obligation
applies to termination clause of contract).
177. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 579.
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out, courts should require agreements be more specific before reading
them to dispense with a requirement that there be good cause to expel
a partner.' u78 The danger posed by a freeze-out is that the partner-
ship will abscond with the expelled partner's capital contributions and
other assets.17 9
Professor Gevurtz also suggests that courts may superimpose
such a substantive restriction on expulsions, despite the partnership
agreement's silence, because the agreement "sets out the minimum,
[but] not necessarily the entire requirement."'' s0 The R.U.P.A. takes
this position,' 8 ' as do many other scholars.182
There are important policy reasons supporting this view. "Appli-
cation of the good faith rule [to partner expulsion] removes the finan-
cial incentives which might impel some lawyers to enter into a war
with their [old] firm, in the hope of winning the battle of the files.' u8 3
Under the aggregate theory of partnership, a partner's removal "dis-
solves" the partnership. Thus, a good faith requirement promotes sta-
178. Id.
179. Dickerson, supra note 121, at 154 ("Given the unlimited personal liability of a
partner for the obligations of the partnership, and given the power of each co-partner to
bind the partnership in a wide scope of activities, a partner is uniquely vulnerable to the
acts of each co-partner. At a minimum, that reality suggests a presumption that the classic
fiduciary duties apply unless otherwise expressly agreed."). Gevurtz proposes a method
for courts to determine whether an expulsion is based on reasonable grounds. First, the
expelling partners must have reasonable grounds for removing the other partner. Second,
these grounds must have actually motivated their decision. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at
581. See also Narducci, supra note 159, at 857-58.
180. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 579.
181. Weidner & Larson, supra note 29, at 25 n.149 (citing cases in which the duty of
good faith was applied to expulsion decisions).
182. See, e.g., Justice Stanley G. Feldman & Mary E. Berkheiser, Dissolution: Good
Faith, Bad Faith-Who Gets the Fee?, in WITHDRAWAL, RETIREMENT, AND DispuTEs:
WHAT YOU AND YOUR FiRM NEED TO KNow 24 (Edward Berger ed., 1986); Bernard J.
Davies, Jr., The Good Faith Principle and the Expulsion Clause in Partnership Law, 33
CoNvEY. & PROP. LAW. (n.s.) 32, 33 (1969) (English legal journal states the general rule,
"[i]f the power of expulsion [of partners] is utilised [sic] for improper purposes or mala fide
the expulsion will be deemed invalid.") (emphasis added) cf. Beveridge, supra 128, at 757
("The American cases [on partnership law] followed the rule expressed in the English
cases."); Anthony L. Marks, Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers: An Uncompromising Ap-
proach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When Law Firms Split Up, 19 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 509, 524 n.114, 525 & 537 (1987) (fiduciary duty applies to law firm decisions and
fiduciary standard exceeds contractual good faith requirements).
183. Feldman & Berkheiser, supra note 182, at 29. Cf. Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful
Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 553, 583 (explaining how good
faith covenant precludes the discharge of a lawyer for complying with ethical rules); Wil-
bur, supra note 15, at 92-93 (arguing that permitting wrongful discharge claims by attor-
neys, who are fired for refusing to commit ethical violations, would advance ethical
standards in the profession).
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bility by ensuring that such organizational shake-ups occur for
legitimate reasons.1 84
The position of a law firm partner is also similar to that of a ten-
ured professor. s5 Tenure is considered a professor's guarantee that
she cannot be discharged except for serious misconduct. 86 Therefore,
it would be absurd to argue that a professor's tenure ensures that the
university will deal with her in good faith, except in the event of dis-
charge. Similarly, it would be wrong to assert that partners have a
duty of good faith to one another in all parts of the business except
expulsion decisions. 187
These arguments draw additional support from two kinds of em-
ployment law cases. First, employees who are hired for a term of
years may not be fired without cause by their employers during the
term.188 Law partners deserve at least as much protection against ar-
184. In Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993), the California Supreme Court
upheld a law firm partnership agreement that contained a clause requiring withdrawing
partners to compensate the firm if they later competed with it. Id. at 160. The court dis-
agreed with the departing partners who had argued that such a contract impermissibly
restricted their right to practice. Id. The court explained that the increasingly turbulent
legal market justifies such precautions. Id. at 159-60. Imposing a good faith limitation on
the discretion of partners regarding expulsion decisions has the same benefit.
185. Many courts and scholars have treated partnership status as similar to that of a
tenured professor. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80-81 n.4 (1984) (Powell,
J., concurring); FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 110, at 683; Chervin, supra note 68, at
210 (analogizing partnership and tenure decisions); Mary Johnson, Hishon v. King &
Spalding: Equal Justice Under Law, 30 Loy. L. REV. 1008, 1013, 1017 (1984) ("Promotion
to partnership has been analogized to an appointment of tenure by a university in that both
represent 'badges of success' in their respective worlds .... Courts also consider the fact
that a promotion to partner or an award of tenure to an individual practically guarantees
that person lifetime job security."); Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94
HARV. L. REV. 457 (1980).
186. Stensrud v. Mayville State College, 368 N.W.2d 519, 521 n.1 (N.D. 1985); Drans v.
Providence College, 383 A.2d 1033, 1039 (R.I. 1978) ("Tenure in the academic community
commonly refers to a status granted, usually after a probationary period, which protects a
teacher from dismissal except for serious misconduct or incompetence.").
187. Johnson, supra note 185, at 1017 (making partner at a law firm, like tenure, is
generally a guarantee of "lifetime job security"); 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119,
§ 7.02(f), at 7:27-28; Gordon, supra note 79, at 61.
188. American workers are presumed to be at-will employees who can be fired for any
reason or no reason at all. H.G. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (this
treatise is credited with creating this doctrine, even though its premises were inaccurate);
Lillard, supra note 138, at 1240 n.38. Historically, the only exception to this rule was em-
ployees who were hired to work for a definite term. Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Employment-at-Will-Is The Model Act the Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179 (1993);
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1817 n.8 (1980) (citing Brekken v. Reader's
Digest Special Prods., Inc., 353 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1965)). They cannot be fired arbitrarily
during the term because that would enable employers to readily circumvent the employ-
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bitrary removal as "term" employees since partners have more perma-
nent positions. 8 9
In addition, several courts have ruled that an implied covenant of
good faith bars an employer from firing an at-will employee in certain
situations.190 However, most state courts disagree' 91 and refuse to
adopt such a requirement because it would erode the doctrine of at-
will employment. 92 By contrast, implying such a covenant to partner
expulsion decisions would further the contractual security that under-
lies the status of being a partner. This contractual security separates
partners from at-will employees. 93
Professor Bromberg takes the contrary view:
ment contract. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1404
(1967) (proposing tort remedy for abusively discharged employees); J. Peter Shapiro &
James F. Ibne, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974)
(suggesting a means of judicial balancing between employees' and employers' rights).
189. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987); 1 BROMBERO & RiBsrEIN, supra note 119, § 1.01, at 1:11.
190. At-will employees may generally be fired for any reason or no reason at all. See
supra note 188. See, e.g., Petermann v. International B'hd of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal.
App. 1959); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). Most commentators see the implied cove-
nant theory in the wrongful discharge context as a "tort theory more than a contract theory
because it tests the defendant's compliance with a duty imposed through public policy
rather than through a voluntary promise." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant:
Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SErON HALL L. REv. 683, 691 (1990).
191. The covenant of good faith is implied by courts as a matter of law. However, state
courts today favor the "more traditional theories such as implied-in-fact contract and pub-
lic policy tort.... ." See Perritt, supra note 190, at 697-98 n.83 (listing cases from various
states rejecting applicability of the implied covenant to the employment situation). One
example of an implied-in-fact employment contract would be a just cause provision in an
employee personnel handbook. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292
N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). Many states recognize a public-policy based claim for a retalia-
tory discharge action. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876(Ill. 1981).
192. The absence of clear limitations in the scope of the implied covenant of good faith
wrongful discharge theory made it unattractive to courts. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman
Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash.
1984). Nonetheless, courts that have rejected the implied covenant of good faith as a gen-
eral exception to at-will employment still have found certain bad faith terminations to be
actionable. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) ("avowedly
opportunistic" actions against an employee are barred even if the employee is an at-will
employee).
193. The meaning of "good faith" in the implied covenant is debated. Lillard, supra
note 138, at 1249-58. Monique Lillard surveyed how courts have used the doctrine in the
employment context and identified eight categories: "too vague to discuss"; "I know it
when I see it"; a benefit of the bargain approach; a good cause requirement; a prohibition
on bad faith conduct; a provision for honesty in fact; an evaluation based on community
"standards/business" practice; and a fair dealing requirement. Id.
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It has been held that the expelling partners need not prove that the
expulsion was in good faith or for good cause shown, and that the
duty of good faith does not require that expulsion be conditioned on
any particular procedures, such as notice, a specification of charges,
or an opportunity to be heard.' 94
Two decisions involving law firms that support his position are
Holman v. Coie'95 and Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray.'96
Those courts refused to examine the motives behind two partner-
ship expulsions because, they reasoned, the purpose behind a silent
partnership agreement was "to provide a simple, practical, and above
all, a speedy method of separating a partner from the firm."'1 97 Profes-
sor Hillman argues that a good faith requirement would create "un-
necessary complications and uncertainties" to partnership
decisions.198 Other scholars argue that implying a good faith limita-
tion contradicts the express terms of the contract. 99 Finally, partner-
ships can assert that restricting their power to expel infringes their
rights to expression and association.2 °
These arguments are flawed. First, a partnership agreement's si-
lence on the expulsion issue does not justify rejecting an implied good
faith limitation. By definition, this limitation is not explicit. As Pro-
fessor Gevurtz points out, this implied term is not inconsistent with a
percentage vote requirement-it supplements that requirement by ad-
ding an implied substantive limitation.20' Second, the U.P.A. and
R.U.P.A., which control when a partnership agreement is silent, both
require bona fide partner expulsions.2 02
194. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 7.02, at 7:28. Ribstein agrees, supra
note 155, at 56.
195. 522 P.2d 515, 517 (Wash. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1011 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975).
196. 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Another case involving a law partnership in
which the duty of good faith between partners was given a narrow construction is Day v.
Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977). See also Smart v.
Hernandez, 66 A.2d 643 (N.H. 1949) (court strictly adheres to language of partnership
agreement in refusing to find broad good duty of good faith); McPherson v. J.E. Sirrine &
Co., 33 S.E.2d 501, 510 (S.C. 1945) ("It is not the province of the court to alter a contract
by construction or to make a new contract for the parties ...."); Ribstein, supra note 155,
at 56 n.85.
197. Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
198. Hillman, supra note 79, at 43. See also Hynes, supra note 148, at 740.
199. See, e.g., Smart, 66 A.2d at 645 (courts should not alter private contracts governing
partnership arrangements); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 124, at 427 ("Actual con-
tracts always prevail over implied ones."); Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 554-55.
200. This objection was raised by the law firm defendant in Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
201. Gevurtz, supra 119, at 580-81.
202. See supra notes 172-176.
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In addition, as Professors Gevurtz and Dickerson note, partner-
ship agreements are designed to provide protection and security to
partners, not to ensure that they can be expelled rapidly.20 3 If the
latter interpretation prevailed, partnership would not be such a cher-
ished professional goal for lawyers. 2°4 Requiring that partner expul-
sion decisions be made in good faith is necessary to fulfill this goal.
Finally, the associational and expressive arguments should be re-
jected because "[i]nvidious private discrimination may be character-
ized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it never has been accorded affirmative constitu-
tional protections. ' 205 Partnership expulsion decisions should, there-
fore, be made in good faith.
V. The Duty of Good Faith as a Bar to Discrimination
Courts should interpret the duty of good faith that governs part-
ners to prohibit sex discrimination for three reasons. First, many
courts have adopted such an interpretation of the duty of good faith in
wrongful discharge cases, and the justifications for these decisions ap-
ply to partnerships. Second, discriminatory conduct is inconsistent
with good faith obligations, regardless of which judicial definition of
good faith is used. Finally, public policy supports this interpretation.
A. The Case Law and Commentary
Both federal and state courts permit plaintiffs to attack discrimi-
nation by alleging that their employers or superiors breached an im-
plied covenant of good faith. One of these cases involved a suit by a
woman partner against her law firm.
In Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores,20 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that an employer vio-
lated the implied covenant of good faith by firing a female employee
who had refused to reciprocate sexual advances. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Lucas v. Brown & Root,
Inc.20 7 and the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe
203. See supra notes 119, 121.
204. See Gordon, supra note 79. See also Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 274 (10th
Cir. 1987).
205. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,78 (1984) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)). See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
206. 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991).
207. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
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Rubber Co. reached the same result.20 8 In these cases, plaintiffs used
the covenant to combat sexually discriminatory conduct. Moreover,
in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,209 the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the fact finder must consider whether an employee was a victim
of sex discrimination in order to decide whether an employer
breached an implied covenant of good faith.
In Beall v. Baker & McKenzie,210 an Illinois state court found that
a woman law partner's allegation that she was denied work and
squeezed out of the partnership due to gender bias stated a claim
because
[c]ases of breach of an implied covenant of good faith typically oc-
cur where the contractual obligation of one party is contingent upon
a condition particularly within the power of that party .... In this
case, defendants had the power to avoid compensating Beall by de-
nying her work assignments. If they denied these assignments with
a discriminatory purpose, as Beall alleges they did, they exercised
their discretion in bad faith and violated the implied covenant.
The egalitarian nature of the partnership structure also supports the
Beall court's ruling that the partnership cannot discriminate. 211
In McKinney v. National Dairy Council,212 the United States Dis-
trict Court for Massachusetts held that the covenant prohibits age dis-
crimination. The court reasoned that "[s]ince Massachusetts law, as
well as federal law, plainly manifests a public policy against age dis-
crimination in employment, it would be a striking limitation of the
scope of the implied covenant if it were held inapplicable to a decision
to terminate because of age. '213 Courts have used the covenant to
attack other forms of discrimination as well.214
208. 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974). See also Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, 915 F.2d 777
(1st Cir. 1990).
209. 771 P.2d 1033, 1047 (Utah 1989).
210. No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. at 10 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992). The
absence of any other cases involving partners suing for discrimination is because the pres-
ence of women and minority partners at these firms is a very recent phenomenon.
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987); HARRING-
TON, supra note 7, at 18; Wilbur, supra note 15.
211. Interpreting the good faith covenant to bar discrimination is consistent with the
terminology used by courts in discussing good faith duties in close corporations. These
courts refer to the obligation of the controlling shareholders not to squeeze out, or discrim-
inate against, the "minority" shareholders. See, e.g., O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
153; Narducci, supra note 159, at 857 n.120 ("[Close corporations should be treated like
partnerships when a squeeze out of minority shareholders is in issue.").
212. 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980).
213. Id. at 1121.
214. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.) (common-
law age discrimination claim), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Savage v. Holiday Inn
Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (implied covenant applied to age discrimination
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Ian Ayres's review of Richard Epstein's book, Forbidden
Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, sup-
ports the thesis that discrimination should be prohibited in private
contracts. Professor Epstein's book advocates the abolition of em-
ployment discrimination laws, and the return to freedom of contract.
However, Professor Ayres states that "Epstein desires not only free-
doh of contract, but a particular kind of freedom. It would be equally
consistent with contractual freedom to imply a warranty of non-
discrimination .... "215 Professor Ayres's reasoning suggests that an
implied duty not to discriminate governs partnerships.216
claim); High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (age discrimination
allegations can support claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith); Wynn v.
Boeing Military Airplane Co., 595 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1984) (implied covenant applied
to race discrimination claim); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (age discrimination claim supports breach of contract action); Pompey v. General
Motors Corp., 189 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1971) (common-law race discrimination claim al-
lowed); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984) (permitting common
law tort action for sexual harassment). Cf. Deramo v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 607 F.
Supp. 100 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (action may be barred where factual underpinnings are
grounded exclusively in public policy theory of wrongful discharge). There are many con-
trary cases listed in Greenbaum, supra note 21, at 68 n.12 that are referenced later.
215. Professor Ayres's full excerpt reads:
Epstein desires not only freedom of contract, but a particular kind of freedom. It
would be equally consistent with contractual freedom to imply a warranty of non-
discrimination that an employer could waive only by explicitly telling employees
and consumers that the employer retains the right to discriminate on the basis of
race. After all, warranties that apartments will be maintained in a livable condi-
tion, or that products will be usable, are routinely presumed in contract law.
Forcing employers to affirmatively contract for the right to discriminate might at
least give employees and consumers information to protect themselves against the
harms of discrimination.
Ayres, supra note 24, at 30.
Given the uproar that would be created, it is unlikely that any modem business would
announce a contractual right to discriminate. For example, the national press ran stories
about flagrant discrimination by the law firm of Baker & McKenzie in its recruiting of an
African-American woman for a summer position. See Charles-Edward Anderson, Affirma-
tive Reaction, 75 A.B.A. J. 20 (June 1989) (interviewer asked the woman how she would
react if someone called her a "black bitch"). See also UPI, Racial Slur Charged to Law
Firnm University Bans Attorneys After Student Reports Offensive Interview, DE-. FREE
PREss, Feb. 3, 1989, at 1A (firm was subjected to a recruiting boycott by law students after
news of the discriminatory incident came out); Daniel J. Lugo, Comment, Don't Believe the
Hype: Affirmative Action in Large Law Firms, 11 LAw & INEo. J. 615, 626 n.48 (1993).
Thus, the implied obligation not to discriminate recognized by Professor Ayres is, as a
practical matter, nonwaivable.
216. Professor Ayres's reasoning is further supported by the extent to which socially
valuable duties are implied in other areas. For example, in the early 20th Century, courts
increasingly used the common law to hold that businesses issue an implied warranty to
consumers that their products are not imminently dangerous. See, e.g,, MacPherson V. Bu-
ick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). It is not coincidental that these common-law developments
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Professor Zemelman also recognizes the tendency of courts to
"treat[ ] the Title VII right to be free from discrimination as an im-
plied contractual term .... ,,217 Addressing the United States
Supreme Court's treatment of contract law, Professor Shell notes that
there are "[i]mmutable rules that bar transactions in such things as...
bias ... and intolerance [that] serve a moral function .... ",218 More-
over, Professors Neil Williams and Steven Burton have demonstrated
that common-law contract doctrines should be interpreted to prohibit
racial discrimination.2 19
However, several courts have ruled that Title VII and state anti-
discrimination statutes preempt common law remedies against em-
ployment discrimination by establishing a comprehensive administra-
tive scheme for addressing such claims.220 Yet these statutes do not
protect partners and, therefore, should not preclude them from com-
mon law redress.22' The Illinois state court in Beall rejected Baker &
parallelled increasing pro-consumer governmental regulation of businesses. EDWARD H.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 24 (1948) ("[MacPherson] is usually
thought to have brought the law into line with 'social considerations."') Thus, new govern-
mental policies often have an impact on the common law's supposed private ordering.
217. Zemelman, supra note 24, at 201. The trend whereby law firms are increasingly
adopting formal policies against sexual harassment, referenced earlier, supports the finding
that partners have an implied contractual right to be free of gender discrimination. See,
e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE LAW, SEXUAL HARASSMENT. A
REPORT AND MODEL POLICY FOR LAW FIRMS (1992). Such formal employment policies
are frequently the source of contractual rights. See supra note 191.
218. Shell, supra note 148, at 526.
219. See Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson
and a State Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 467 (1990) ("State and fed-
eral civil rights statutes prohibiting private racial discrimination could enter quite a few
contracts as implied terms imposing obligations of nondiscrimination on racial and other
odious grounds in contract performance'); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Im-
proper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimina-
tion in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 183 (1994). See also Michael C.
Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights:
The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1294 (1993)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act should not permit employers to purchase the
right to discriminate through a properly drafted release); Greenbaum, supra note 21, at
103-05.
220. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., 728 F.2d 221, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1984) (statutory
remedy in Pennsylvania Human Relations Act precludes common law claim); see generally
Greenbaum, supra note 21, at 68 (listing cases); 2 HENRY H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DIsMIS-
SAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.25 (3d ed. 1992) (listing cases).
221. One objection to such a broad interpretation is that it unfairly favors partners by
enabling them to bring discrimination lawsuits in a court without first going to the EEOC
or to a state civil rights agency like other discrimination plaintiffs. See, e.g., Mallor, supra
note 21, at 669 (discussing permissibility of common-law discrimination claims given that
the EEOC administrative process is circumvented). But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2101-.2804 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act permits discrim-
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McKenzie's preemption argument for this reason, and its decision is in
accord with other preemption cases. 22 Moreover, none of the cases
in which common law discrimination claims were found to be pre-
empted dealt with claims brought by partners. Professor Marc Green-
baum has thoroughly analyzed federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes and has concluded that they were not intended to be
preemptive.3
B. The Various Definitions of Good Faith
Judges have used four definitions of the duty of good faith in em-
ployment cases.224 Discriminatory conduct breaches the duty under
all four tests.
1) Just Cause
Several courts and scholars have concluded that the duty of good
faith requires an employer to have just cause before taking an adverse
personnel action. 225 Examples of just cause include a company's need
to cut jobs because of financial problems, employee misconduct, or
ination plaintiffs to bypass the state agency and to sue in state court). This objection ig-
nores the myriad disadvantages partners face compared to employees, such as associates,
covered by Title VII. The associates can save attorney fees, costs, and other personal re-
sources by letting the EEOC or a state agency investigate their discrimination claims. The
information obtained can then be used to assist in their federal lawsuits. PLAYER ET AL.,
supra note 82, at 666. In addition, Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42
U.S.C. § 1981 A(b), permits associates to seek punitive damages and attorney fees,
whereas most courts will not permit a partner suing on a contractual basis to seek either.
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 n.7 (Mass. 1977) (punitive
damages possible in a tort action, not a contract action).
222. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)
(courts generally do not view federal statutes as preempting areas of the common law
unless Congress indicated a desire to preclude common law remedies). Section 708 of Title
VII says that Title VII is not preemptive. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. See also BARBARA L.
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINATION LAW 290 (Cum. Supp. 1991)
("Title VII generally is not preemptive."); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-46 (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1993) (Fair Employment Practices Act does not provide exclusive remedy); MiCH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. 88 37.2101-.2804 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act does not provide exclusive remedy); Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 272 N.W.2d
550 (Mich. 1978).
223. Greenbaum, supra note 21, at 85-96. It is not necessary to revisit this issue in
detail given his comprehensive analysis.
224. Professor Lillard has discussed several other ways that the covenant has been in-
terpreted in the employment context. Lillard, supra note 138, at 1249-61. The other inter-
pretations have no independent substantive content and when taken out of context cannot
be analyzed properly. For example, some judges have announced that they know a viola-
tion of the covenant when they see one without providing any description of how another
court would be able to recognize a violation. Id. at 1249 (citing cases).
225. See, e.g., Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1988) (finder of
fact may infer bad faith from absence of just cause). Perritt has stated:
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unsatisfactory job performance. 226 Obviously, a law partnership's dis-
criminatory animus toward a particular sex would not be just cause.227
2) Bad Faith Conduct
Many courts have defined the implied covenant of good faith
negatively by providing examples of prohibited conduct. According
to Professor Summers, this "excluder" approach shows that the cove-
nant precludes "a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith." 22s
The commentary to section 404 of the R.U.P.A. cites Summers's views
as supporting the duty of good faith.229 Using this approach, courts
Conceptually, the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
breached when an employer terminates an employee without a reason rationally
related to the employer's legitimate business interests. In simpler terms, the cov-
enant is breached when an employee is dismissed without good cause.
1 HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.54, at 389 (3d ed.
1992) (emphasis added). Gevurtz has said that the partners' fiduciary duties require that a
partnership termination be based on good cause unless the partnership agreement is very
clear about requiring some lesser proof of good faith. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 580-81.
This reasoning is consistent with Justice Cardozo's discussion of fiduciary duties in Mein-
hard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
226. 1 PERRr, supra note 225, § 4.46, at 369 (and cases cited therein). See Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (interpreting an employer hand-
book to require that an employer have just cause to fire an employee).
227. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 162, at 13 n.87 ("Obviously, race [discrimination] is not
just cause. Nor is sex [discrimination]."); Greenbaum, supra note 21, at 76 . Professor
Perritt acknowledges that many relationships that preclude discharge without just cause
"enumerate reasons for which dismissal will not occur, e.g. sex, race, age, disability, or
sexual orientation discrimination." I PERRrr-r, supra note 225, § 4.46, at 369-70. See also
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). One of the first law review
articles to advocate modification of the at-will employment doctrine to permit a tort claim
for abusive discharge relied on the anti-discrimination laws. Lawrence Blades, Employ-
ment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1414 (1967).
228. Summers, supra note 144, at 819. Professor Summers made the following defense
of this position:
In my view, good faith in the general requirement of good faith in ordinary moral
dealings, and in the general case law of contract up to the late 1960s, was most
felicitously conceptualized as an "excluder." That is, it was not appropriately
formulable in terms of some general positive meaning ....
Id. But see Lillard, supra note 138, at 1255-57. Professor Lillard suggests that the excluder
approach lacks definition. Moreover, she says that certain firings that we deem illegal (e.g.
firing an employee as her pension is about to vest) are actually quite rational (since the
employer seeks to save pension monies). Thus, the excluder approach that attacks bad
faith conduct does not cover all forms of objectionable discharges. In addition, this test
may be too difficult for plaintiffs since it forces them to prove the defendant's state of
mind. Id.
Professor Summers's seminal law review article on the implied covenant of good faith was
referenced in the commentary to the Second Restatement of Contracts in which the cove-
nant was endorsed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 205 rptr. notes (1981).
229. See 1 BROMBERO & RiBSMIN, supra note 119, app. at 208 (1992). The R.U.P.A.
commentary to § 404 provides:
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have prohibited arbitrary and capricious actions,230 avowedly opportu-
nistic acts,231 acts motivated by "disinterested malevolence," 232 and
acts motivated by "spite or ill will."'23a The commentary to section 205
Some commentators believe that good faith is more properly [defined] by what it
excludes than by what it includes. See Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in Gen-
eral Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. Rev. 195, 262 (1968):
"Good faith, as judges generally use the term in matters contractual, is best un-
derstood as an 'excluder'-a phrase with no general meaning or meanings of its
own. Instead, it functions to rule out many different forms of bad faith. It is hard
to get this point across to persons used to thinking that every word must have one
or more general meanings of its own-must be either univocal or ambiguous."
6 U.L.A. 254 (Supp. 1993).
230. Bane v. Ferguson, 707 F. Supp. 988,994 (N.D. Ill.) (covenant of good faith used to
"check the exercise of a party's discretion under a contract" over another party), affd, 890
F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1989); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 786-87 n.19 (Conn.
1984) ("It would appear that the rubric bad faith would be applied to any discharge which
is merely arbitrary, i.e., without a valid reason .... "); Foster Enterprises v. Germania Fed.
Say. & Loan Assn., 421 N.E.2d 1375, 1381 ("Good faith between contracting parties re-
quires that a party vested with contractual discretion must exercise his discretion reason-
ably and may not do so. arbitrarily or capriciously."); Beall v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 91
CH 9448, mem. op. (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 124, at 436. This use of the covenant is common when one party to the contract
has greater power than the other and when there is a danger of the stronger party exploit-
ing that power without justification. Hillman, supra note 79, at 46 n.237.
231. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) ("avowedly
opportunistic" action toward employee is impermissible); Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th
Cir. 1983) (employer may not dismiss an employee without good cause and in bad faith,
and then enforce a restrictive covenant severely limiting scope of employee's professional
practice). Jordan was decided by Judge Easterbrook using a contractarian approach to the
duty of good faith over a dissent by Judge Posner. Some scholars have harshly criticized
Jordan. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obli-
gation, 1988 DuKE LJ. 879, 884. The issue in Jordan was whether a closely held corpora-
tion breached its fiduciary duty to an employee-shareholder when it repurchased his
shares, yet neglected to inform him that negotiations had started that might lead to a
merger between the corporation and another entity. Id. at 882. Professor DeMott posits
that Judge Easterbrook misunderstood the concept of fiduciary duty. She says that Judge
Easterbrook found that the corporation had a duty to disclose based on "a standby or off-
the-rack guess about what the parties would agree to if they dickered about the subject
explicitly." Id. at 884. She calls this the "hypothetical bargain" approach to fiduciary du-
ties and says that it is contractual in nature and "confuses the analysis" because fiduciary
duties exist independent of the contractual relationship. Id. at 885-87. Judge Easterbrook
responds by stating that Professor DeMott's analysis contains an amorphous "conclusion"
about the source of these fiduciary duties and "it takes a theory to beat a theory." Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 124, at 434.
232. See, e.g., Tourville v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986), appeal denied, 521 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1987) ("disinterested malevolence").
233. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. Rev. 369, 387 n.80 (1980) ("Some noneconomic motives, such as
spite or ill will, are likely to run afoul of the good faith performance doctrine or otherwise
to result in liability for breach of contract."); Davies, supra note 182, at 33.
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of the Second Restatement of Contracts lists other prohibited
conduct.
Discriminatory conduct has many of the same qualities as these
other bad faith actions. For example, in Reed v. Reed,234 the Supreme
Court declared a statute that discriminated on the basis of sex to be
unconstitutional because it was arbitrary and irrational-just like the
bad faith conduct identified above.235 Other cases have characterized
discriminatory attitudes as being motivated by spite or ill will.36
Thus, discriminatory acts are quintessential examples of bad faith
conduct.
3) The Honesty Requirement
Many courts have followed the U.C.C., the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, and various scholars by interpreting the duty of
good faith to require honesty above all.237 The Model Employment
Termination Act 238 also defines good faith as "honesty in fact." 239
However, the R.U.P.A. has rejected this definition of good faith.240
234. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
235. Such discrimination is generally viewed as illegal because it reflects preferences
for one group over another that bear no relation to the real abilities and competence of the
person being affected. KATHARINE BARTLEr, GENDER AND LAw 72 (1993) ("Formal
equality insists not only that those who are similarly situated be treated alike, but that
stereotypes and overgeneralizations not dictate who is determined to be similarly situated
to whom."). Such acts are therefore arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Con-
gress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment ... )
(emphasis added).
236. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (preference in favor of
veterans that harms women is not illegal unless the preference was intended to discrimi-
nate because of, and not in spite of, gender).
237. The relevant U.C.C. and Restatement sections were discussed supra notes 138-147
and accompanying text. See also Heney v. Sutro & Co., 153 P. 972, 974 (Cal. Ct. App.
1915) ("As understood in law the phrase 'in good faith' has a settled and well-defined
meaning, which generally imports that.., the transaction ... was honestly conceived and
consummated .... ); Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 167 (Mont. 1988) (an employer
must show a "fair and honest reason" for a dismissal). See generally Lillard, supra note
138, at 1234-35, 1257-58; MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7 (1988).
238. Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Aug. 8, 1991. 137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 513 (Aug. 26, 1991).
239. MODEL EMPL. TERM. AcT § 1(5). The problem with this definition alone is that
it would not prohibit a controlling partner from honestly and openly taking advantage of
another partner. Nonetheless, the standard would encourage forthright communication to
a partner who is about to be expelled.
240. 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, app. at 182 (1992). The R.U.P.A. may
allow a partnership to agree to such a limited duty of good faith. But cf. Dickerson, supra
note 121, at 145 (suggesting the R.U.P.A. duty of good faith is mandatory and is more
stringent than the U.C.C. approach); supra note 148.
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Nonetheless, courts using this approach should also prohibit discrimi-
natory conduct given its inherent dishonesty.
Discriminatory conduct is dishonest in two ways. First, such con-
duct is based on the victim's sex or skin color rather than her personal
qualities and skills. This falsification of the victi'm is dishonest.241 Sec-
ond, the wrongdoer in most cases pretends that he did not discrimi-
nate and fabricates a legitimate reason for its action. Thus, the crucial
issue in most discrimination cases is whether the proffered legitimate
justification is a pretext (i.e., whether it is true or false).242
4) The Parties' Expectations
According to some courts, the duty of good faith is limited to the
contracting parties' reasonable unstated expectations, although the
U.P.A. and R.U.P.A. reject such a weak approach as stated earlier.243
241. For example, sexism has been defined as "the tendency to behave towards and
think about people purely on the grounds of gender, to generalize about individuals and
groups on the basis of their biology rather than to recognize their actual interests and
capacities." Rose Pearson & Albie Sachs, Barristers and Gentlemen: A Critical Look at
Sexism in the Legal Profession, 43 MOD. L. Rv. 400, 407-08 (1980). In Saint Francis Col-
lege v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the prohi-
bition on racial discrimination in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was aimed at preventing an individual
from being reduced to a "genetic[ ] part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive
sub-grouping of homo sapiens." Id. at 607 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97
(1971). See also MAcKiNNON, supra note 28, at 107, 165 ("Women are substantively ab-
sent."); SuNs-irN, supra note 69, at 62 ("The motivating idea here is that differences that
are irrelevant from the moral point of view ought not to be turned into social disadvan-
tages . . ").
242. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (discussing pretext
stage in employment discrimination cases); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (adopting a tripartite allocation of the burden of proof in individual disparate treat-
ment employment discrimination cases: (1) requiring plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie
case; then (2) requiring defendant to produce some evidence of a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory justification; and (3) requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant's justifica-
tion is false or pretextual). In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff does not
automatically prevail if pretext is proven. Id. at 2756. The jury can decide that plaintiff
wins but the jury is still free to conclude that defendant did not discriminate. Id. The
Hicks approach demonstrates that defendant's honesty or lack thereof is still the crucial
issue in discrimination cases.
Courts that adopt the view that a partner breaches an implied covenant of good faith
by discriminating against another partner may wish to draw on Hicks and McDonnell
Douglas in determining how to allocate the burden of proof. Those courts could also draw
onAhe case-law dealing with the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case alleging the breach of
an implied covenant of good faith. See, e.g., 1 PERirrr, supra note 225, § 4.64, at 423-25
(implied covenant of good faith jury instructions). This is one of many practical issues that
will have to be resolved if courts adopt the thesis of this Article.
243. See, e.g., Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 494 N.E.2d 581, 588
(Ill. App. 1986); Hobbs v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 771 P.2d 125 (Mont. 1989) (declaring
that covenant arose from objective manifestations of employer giving rise to reasonable
employee expectations); Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith,
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This definition centers on the career opportunities the employee gives
up to accommodate her employer, and on the employee's reasonable
belief that she will receive benefits from the employer in return.244
For example, an employer cannot legally fire a long-serving at-
will employee, without cause, right before the employee's pension
vests. 245 An employer also cannot discharge a recently-hired em-
ployee, absent cause, when the employer lured the employee away
from another job and the employee relocated at substantial ex-
pense.246 Employees cannot be fired arbitrarily in these situations be-
cause of their personal sacrifices-long service in one case and
substantial inconvenience in the other.247 This reasonable expectation
approach also precludes discrimination against partners.
Lawyers traditionally sacrifice a great deal to make partner. They
work long hours for many years as associates before they become eli-
gible.248 The high-stakes nature of the work, particularly in a lawyer's
1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 620 (implied covenant of good faith should not be extended "beyond
bargained-for risk allocations" in order to prevent uncertain enforcement); Lillard, supra
note 138, at 1249-52 (a detailed discussion of the "benefit of the bargain" approach); Per-
ritt, supra note 190, at 721-23. See also Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781,
788-89 (Conn. 1984) ("Although we endorse the applicability of the good faith and fair
dealing principle to employment contracts, its essence is the fulfillment of the reasonable
expectations of the parties."). However, the R.U.P.A. imposes greater good faith require-
ments on partners than this, according to its own commentary and according to Professor
Dickerson. See Dickerson, supra note 121, at 145.
244. Burton, supra note 233, at 387 (expectations of the parties should be assessed in
terms of totality of the circumstances and opportunities foregone); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 124 (hypothetical bargain approach based on likely expectations).
245. Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Maddaloni v.
Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, 422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), modified, 438
N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1982); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
246. See, e.g., Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l., Inc., 544 A.2d 170 (Conn. 1988); Boothby v.
Texon, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 1028 (Mass. 1993); Peyton, supra note 80, at 29 ("Other actions by
firms may give rise to reliance-based contractual claims. For example, if an attorney re-
signs a position after being promised longstanding employment at another firm, and is laid
off from the new firm shortly thereafter, the attorney may claim that he or she relied on the
promise to his or her detriment and may be awarded damages based on breach of
contract.")
247. See also Lien v. Wilson & Mcllvane, 1988 WL 84726, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1988)
(attorney may sue law firm for breaching its promise that her marriage to one of the firm's
partners would not affect her employment).
248. The average billable hours worked by associates has increased over the last 15-25
years. Thomas F. Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, 76 A.B.A. J. 68, 71 (Jan. 1990) ("[T]he
average associate [was] billing 1,696 hours in 1979 and 1,834 hours in 1988."); HARRING-
TON, supra note 7, at 17, 26, 29; Kaye, supra note 8, at 114 (survey of the top 100 New York
City law firms showed that billable hours have gone up by one-third); Hon. William H.
Rehnquist, The State of The Legal Profession, 14 LEGAL ECON. 44 (1988) ("Young associ-
ates in large law firms today apparently work much harder, and under significantly differ-
ent conditions, than they did 25 years ago."). The number of years it takes to make partner
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trial practice, makes it extremely stressful. This stressful work is com-
pounded by its tedious nature,24 9 as exemplified by lengthy document
reviews.250 The pressure is heightened by the steadily decreasing
number of associates who make partner.25' It is hardly surprising that
lawyers have comparatively high instances of depression and
problems with alcohol.252 Moreover, those associates who make part-
ner contribute their own capital to the firm and are at risk for the
malfeasance of their colleagues and other firm debts. 53
has also risen to between seven and ten. HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 38 (the weeding
out process for associates has become lengthier); Holmes, supra note 16, at 14. Also, there
are different levels of partners at many firms which further delays a lawyer's arrival at the
position of equity partner. HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 85-86; Holmes, supra note 16, at
22 n.18.
249. HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 38,73,78. See also Robert L. Nelson, Practice and
Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms, 95 A.B.A. FouND. RES. J.
97, 133 (1981):
These days you get a very narrow conception of the role of the lawyer .... I think
today that the lawyer is more concerned with technical compliance, about the
complexities of the law, rather than how things should be done. The fact that law
has become so much more complex, there are so many technical details to do in
this legal climate, means the lawyers don't have the time to take a broader view of
things.
250. Holmes, supra note 16, at 15-16 ("For an associate who sets her sights on partner-
ship at a large firm, the way up is long and draining. She is expected to work grueling
hours. Her work may not be riveting. Law firms 'relegate thousands of the best young
minds in America to sifting aimlessly through documents or writing endless streams of
legal memoranda."'). For a detailed discussion of the increasing pressures on big firm at-
torneys in the 1980s, see HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 24-40. For example, the dramatic
escalation of associate salaries in the 1980s meant that firms had to leverage the associates
for ever increasing amounts of work in order to bill more and cover the salaries. The
Harrington book consists of interviews with 100 female graduates of Harvard Law School,
and it amply demonstrates that these stresses were worse for women because they genet-
ally took on the domestic roles in their romantic relationships, such as taking care of chil-
dren. Id. at 135-147, 236.
251. Id at 38; Gordon, supra note 79, at 60.
252. Holmes, supra note 16, at 24:
[Ain eminent psychiatrist noted that the high incidence of stress-related disorders
among attorneys suggests that lawyers are "one of the most highly stressed pro-
fessional groups" (Lefer 1986, p. 23). Other evidence supports this assumption.
Eighteen to 30 percent of attorneys drink too much, as compared with 10 percent
of the general population. And some 34 out of 100,000 lawyers commit suicide, a
figure which is twice as high as the rate for the general population. (Zemp 1981, p.
37).
See also G. Andrew Benjamin, et al., Comprehensive Lawyer Assistance Programs: Justifi-
cation and Model, 16 LAw & Psy. REv. 113 (1992) (analysis of data from Washington state
lawyers demonstrated that "one-third of the lawyers suffered from psychological, behav-
ioral and physical symptoms that indicated the presence of depression, alcohol abuse or
cocaine abuse"); Rutledge, supra note 12, at 32.
253. Dickerson, supra note 121, at 154.
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Law firm associates do not make these sacrifices in vain. They
labor to make partner based on their reasonable belief that partner-
ship guarantees them job security, financial rewards, and greater
power within the firm.254 Law firms that discharge partners find
themselves receiving substantial press coverage because such dis-
charges are still the exception, not the rule.25 5 Moreover, law firms,
which seek high quality work from their associates, foster the impres-
sion that making partner is worth the sacrifice.256 It would be incon-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of a partner who made these
sacrifices if a law firm could fire her for discriminatory reasons.257
C. The Public Policy Rationale
Courts should interpret the implied covenant of good faith as
protecting partners from sex discrimination because this interpreta-
tion furthers the public policy against such discrimination embodied in
the United States Constitution, Title VII, state constitutions, and state
anti-discrimination laws. Professor Player is correct when he states
that "[t]he two concepts of 'public policy' and implied obligations of
good faith and fair dealing are not mutually exclusive and can operate
simultaneously. 258
As discussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Burke and Hishon support this policy. It is also supported by two
cases in which the Supreme Court refused to enforce contractual
clauses that would have permitted racial discrimination: Shelley v.
Kramer259 and Hansberry v. Lee.260 The Court in Shelley invalidated a
254. The Bromberg treatise and the Wheeler case confirm that partners generally have
great job security. See supra note 120. See also Lien v. Wilson & Mcllvaine, 1988 WL
84726, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1988) ("At that time, W & M told Lien that W & M's policy
was to hire only associates whom the firm believed had the ability to become partners in
the firm."); Gordon, supra note 79, at 61 (law partnerships traditionally offer "greater job
security" than other jobs); Johnson, supra note 185.
255. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
256. Clark, supra note 80, at 123 (law firms often entice associates to join by oral or
written promises that partnership awaits them in the future if they simply work hard);
Holmes, supra note 16, at 14 ("[T]he common practice of promoting 'worthy' associates to
the partnership .. . create[s] a powerful incentive for associates to make a good
impression.").
257. Moreover, partners expect to have more rights than their associates. Yet, this is
not the case since partners are left unprotected from discrimination whereas associates are
covered by Title VII. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
258. PLAYER, supra note 237, at 9. In McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.
Supp. 1108, 1121 (D. Mass. 1980), and in several of the aforementioned implied covenant
of good faith cases, the courts emphasized that public policy supported a ruling that the
employer's offensive conduct should be actionable. See also Perritt, supra note 190, at 691.
259. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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restrictive covenant that barred the sale of a house to African-Ameri-
cans as violative of the 14th Amendment. Shelley demonstrated the
Court's hostility toward private contracts that permit discrimination
given the Court's "stretch" to find state action.261 Moreover, in Han-
sberry, the Court refused to bar the plaintiffs from challenging a ra-
cially restrictive covenant on constitutional grounds, even though the
covenant had been upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court. These
precedents demonstrate that the Court has virtually prohibited dis-
crimination in private contracts.
A later United States Supreme Court decision, Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States,262 also supports this policy argument. In Bob
Jones, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a non-profit educational
institution that discriminated on the basis of race was a charitable en-
tity for tax exemption purposes.263 Historically, the Internal Revenue
Service had said yes.264 However, the Court said that a racially dis-
criminatory institution could not be considered a charity for tax pur-
poses in the 1980s, given the general public policy against racial
discrimination evidenced by federal civil rights statutes, state statutes,
and Supreme Court decisions. 265
260. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
261. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473 (1962). The Court had to find that state action was present to invoke the Consti-
tution's prohibitions on racial discrimination. The private nature of the restrictive cove-
nant made it difficult to find state action.
262. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). See also Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, 862 F.2d 963,
970 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of venue change where change would injure plaintiff's
ability to press civil rights claim alleging that defendant terminated motel franchise for
racially-motivated reasons). The court stated: "While individuals are free to regulate their
purely private disputes by means of contractual choice of forum, we cannot adopt a per se
rule that gives these private arrangements dispositive effect where the civil rights laws are
concerned."
263. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 577.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 593-96 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, for example). The Court used
this approach in an earlier case when it stated, "It has always been the duty of the com-
mon-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave
the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles-many of
them derived from earlier legislative exertions." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375, 392 (1970). Marc Greenbaum summarized the views of numerous scholars who hold
this evolving view of the common law in his article, Toward a Common Law of Discrimina-
tion. Greenbaum, supra note 21, at 105-08. The Honorable Guido Calabresi addressed
this issue in his classic work, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) in
which, as Greenbaum points out, Calabresi "denounce[d] the judicial policy of treating
statutes separately from the common law and proposes a more expansive role for common-
law development." Id. at 108-109 n.275. See also Burton, supra note 219, at 434 ("As
Dean Guido Calabresi pointed out, much of our thinking about law draws too sharp a
distinction between statutory law and common law. There is a need for innovations to
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Consistent with the reasoning of Bob Jones, although the com-
mon law did not prohibit sex discrimination in 1964,266 it does today
because of the thirty-year history of Title VII's prohibitions, state anti-
discrimination laws,267 state constitutional provisions,268 and Supreme
Court rulings outlawing sex discrimination.269 This history shows that
sex discrimination is against public policy.270 The recent national at-
relate these two kinds of law in a way that enhances the law's coherence and relevance to
contemporary circumstances.")
266. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
("Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could fashion his person-
nel policies on the basis of assumptions about the differences between men and women,
whether or not the assumptions were valid.").
267. See, e.g., Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101 to 10-103
(1991); Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination, MINN. STAT. § 363.03 subd. 6 (1971 &
1994); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993). All but
four states have an anti-discrimination statute. Mallor, supra note 21, at 652 n.11.
268. The following state constitutions bar discrimination on the basis of sex. ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 3 (1972); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 29 (1972); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20
(1974); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1972); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1971); MD. CONST. Declara-
tion of Rights, art. 46 (1972); MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (1976); MoNT. CONsT. art. 2, § 4
(1973); N.H. CONST. Pt. 1., art. 2 (1974); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18 (1973); PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 28 (1971); TEx. CONST. art. 31, § 1 (1972); UTAH CONsT. art. 4, § 1 (1896); VA. CONST.
art. 1, § 11 (1971); WASH. CONsT. art. 31, § 1 (1972); Wyo. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 3 and art. 6,
§ 1 (1890).
One criticism that could be made of this public policy analysis is that it assumes that
glass ceiling discrimination is a pervasive problem in this country, and yet argues at the
same time that the nation's public policy is overwhelmingly intolerant of employment dis-
crimination. This criticism confuses our legal norms (and accepted public policies) with
our inability to meet them. Our real world failures in no way diminish the shared nature of
those norms. See, e.g., Slade, supra note 11, at B12 (explaining that increasing numbers of
law firms have detailed written policies against sexual harassment despite the continuing
discrimination problems that women lawyers face).
269. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that classifications
based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to heightened judicial scru-
tiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(gender-based classifications must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives).
270. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 188, at 180 n.3 (1993) ("three decades of increas-
ingly expansive civil rights legislation testify to the concern about extirpating nearly all
forms of categorical or status-based discrimination from the workplace"). Marc Green-
baum asserts that Title VII and the anti-discrimination statutes embody a public policy
favoring the "elimination of class-based discrimination from the workplace." Greenbaum,
supra note 21, at 106.
It is true that some remnants of differential treatment of women remain, especially in
the military where women are still barred from combat roles. Moreover, Title VII has a
provision that permits barring women from certain jobs if the employer demonstrates that
sex is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(e) (1981).
However, there has been significant movement during the Clinton Administration toward
opening up more military positions to women. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Navy Women Bring-
ing New Era on Carriers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1994, at 1. In addition, the U.S. Supreme
Court recently ruled that a company that had excluded women from assembling batteries
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tention focused on prominent figures accused of sexual harassment
further highlights public sentiments against such acts.271
was guilty of sex discrimination. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). The
company prevented the women from working in the battery area because the company
feared that exposure to lead could injure a pregnant woman's fetus. Id. at 190-91. The
Court determined that it was up to the female workers to decide whether they wished to
take that risk. Id. at 197-98. The National Law Journal's December 20, 1993 survey also
suggests that the position of women lawyers has improved slightly in the last several years
and that more firms now have written sexual harassment policies and better parental leave
policies. Supra note 90.
271. Chris S. Quillin, Note, The Expansion of the Public Policy Exception to the At-Will
Termination Rule After Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 29 TULSA LJ. 207, 214-15 (1993)
("Recently, the severity and prevalence of sexual discrimination have been increasingly
recognized nationally."). In 1993, for example, a record number of 88,000 charges of em-
ployment discrimination were filed with the EEOC-an increase of nearly 22 % from a
year earlier. See Fair Empl. Prac. Summ. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 31, 1994). According to the
EEOC, increases in charges of disability discrimination and sex harassment were largely
responsible. Id. It is unlikely that incidents of discrimination increased dramatically from
1992 to 1993. Instead, the increase presumably reflects greater public unwillingness to tol-
erate employment discrimination.
This greater awareness of the problem is apparent in the popular press and culture.
Sexual harassment stories are now front page news, evidenced by the media's coverage of
the Navy's Tailhook scandal and of Senator Packwood's alleged indiscretions with women.
See, eg., Andrea Stone, Tailhook: Boom Starts Lowering, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 1993, at
3A (reporting that the Pentagon's examination of the 1991 Navy Tailhook convention re-
vealed that 83 women were sexually assaulted through molestation, the exposing by the
male officers of their genitalia, and public sex); Ron Clairborne, World News Saturday
(ABC television broadcast, June 27, 1992) (commenting that the Tailhook Scandal has sig-
nificantly altered the Navy's view of sexual harassment and "that the old excuse that boys
will be boys" is no longer acceptable). But see McWhirter, supra note 31 (stating that even
though over 28 women have accused the Oregon Senator of sexual misconduct, major cor-
porations are said to be contributing to his legal defense fund).
The hit movie Philadelphia (Columbia TriStar 1993) involved an employment discrimi-
nation lawsuit by an attorney allegedly fired by his law firm because he had AIDS. The
movie starred the popular actors Tom Hanks and Denzel Washington, and Hanks won the
Academy Award as Best Actor. Claudia Eller, "Schindler's List" Brings Triumph for
Spielberg; Movies: Director Wins for Best Picture; Tom Hanks is Honored as Best Actor
and Holly Hunter is Best Actress, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1994, at Al. In addition, the popu-
lar author of such novels as JuRAssic PARK (1990) and THE ANDROMEDA STRAIN (1969),
Michael Crichton, wrote a best selling novel entitled DIscLosuRE (1994) about a woman
boss who sexually harasses a male employee. The book deals with the legal and corporate
shenanigans that result from the harassment. It is currently being produced as a motion
picture starring Demi Moore and Michael Douglas. Michael Giltz and David Denby, Mov-
ies; Guide to Fall 1994, NEw YORK, Sep. 12, 1994, at 64.
The source of this increased awareness of sexual harassment and employment discrim-
ination can be traced back to Anita Hill's riveting testimony at the Clarence Thomas con-
firmation hearings in late 1991. HARRINGTON, supra note 7, at 105, 110-19; Slade, supra
note 11. In 1991 there were 72 sexual harassment claims filed with the Michigan Depart-
ment of Civil Rights and 6,892 filed with the EEOC. In 1992, after the Thomas hearings,
those numbers increased to 188 and 10,578 respectively. See High Court Makes Harass-
ment Easier to Prove, DET. FREE PREss, Nov. 10, 1993, at 1A. See also Crothers, supra
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The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991 demonstrates that America's
elected representatives, Congress and the President, will not tolerate
sex discrimination in upper-level positions. The references to sex dis-
crimination at law firms in the legislative history of the Act confirm
that it applies to professionals. 272
Several courts have also ruled that a company that discharges a
female at-will employee because of her gender violates public pol-
icy.27 3 Yet this public policy argument is stronger for women partners
because they are protected by a partnership contract, and courts are
supposed to construe contracts in a manner consistent with public pol-
icy. A contract is contrary to public policy if it offends clearly estab-
lished constitutional and statutory policies or abridges a fiduciary
duty.274 The laws against sex discrimination embody such a public
note 8, at 13 ("In the last quarter of 1991, sexual harassment claims filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission were 71 percent higher than in the same quarter of
1990."). The U.S. Supreme Court recently strengthened Title VII sexual harassment claims
by ruling unanimously that a woman need not show severe psychological injury in order to
maintain such claims. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In sum, the
public policy against sex discrimination is clear.
272. This is further demonstrated by the OFCCP's actions in auditing the Wall Street
law partnership, White & Case. See Alvarez, supra note 9 (detailing the procedures involv-
ing the audit of White & Case regarding glass ceiling discrimination). The government's
auditing of a major law firm strongly demonstrates that the glass ceiling in law firms is no
longer acceptable. Cf. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Title VII's legislative history shows that it was meant to eliminate discrimination that kept
women and minorities back from "ascend[ing] the higher rungs in professional ... life.").
273. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990) (public policy
claim for sex discrimination); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-89 (Cal. 1992) (dis-
charge due to employee's efforts to assist investigation into sexual harassment claims vio-
lates state public policy); Foster v. Albertson's, Inc., 835 P.2d 720, 726 (Mont. 1992) (public
policy claim for sexual harassment); Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949
(Utah 1992)(common law sex discrimination claim permitted). But see Howard v. Wolff
Broadcasting Corp., 611 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1992) (rejecting public policy and implied cove-
nant claims premised on sex discrimination), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1849 (1993). See gener-
ally 1 PERRITT, supra note 225, § 5.25, at 485 n.335-36 (listing courts that have permitted
common-law discrimination claims).
274. Shell, supra note 148, at 441. Section 512 of the original Restatement of Contracts
specifies that a bargain is illegal if its "formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or
otherwise opposed to public policy." The Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115
N.E. 505, 506-07 (Ohio 1916), court stated:
Sometimes such public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by statute;
sometimes by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides only in the cus-
toms and conventions of the people-in their clear consciousness and conviction
of what is naturally and inherently just and right between man and man ....
Public policy is the cornerstone-the foundation--of all Constitutions, statutes,
and judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and its depth,
greater than any or all of them.
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policy. Thus, the implied covenant cannot be interpreted to contradict
that policy.
Finally, courts should require law partners to comply with the
public policy against discrimination because law partners symbolize
the justice system to many Americans. One scholar writes that the
legal community must "not tolerate laws, behavior, or attitudes that
indicate that any member of society [such as lawyers] is being treated
[with special favor] because he or she belongs to a particular segment
of society."275 Moreover, judicial activism is appropriate here because
each state's highest court or bar association has traditionally regulated
its own lawyers to ensure that they do not act illegally.276 Thus, courts
should interpret the implied covenant of good faith to prohibit law
firm partners from discriminating against other partners on the basis
of sex.
VI. The Common Law Limitations on Partner Lawsuits
There is one roadblock that may stand in the way of courts per-
mitting employment discrimination lawsuits by partners.277 Under the
common law and aggregate theories of partnership, one partner can-
not sue another because this would create the "procedural anomaly of
a partner in effect suing himself."278 Partner A would be liable for
lawsuits brought against co-partners B and C, even if the lawsuits
were brought by A.279 Consequently, the only permissible remedy
that one partner had against another was for an accounting at eq-
275. Wilson, supra note 44, at 840. Congress recently subjected itself to federal dis-
crimination laws after having exempted itself for years. FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra
note 110, at 547-48.
276. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assoc., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (discussing Ohio
Bar's restrictions on lawyer advertising); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCt, Preface (1972) ("Almost fifty years ago, the American Bar Association formu-
lated the original Canons of Judicial Ethics. Those canons occasionally amended, have
been adopted in most states."); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 751.
277. Another criticism is that this Article's thesis could erode the freedom that part-
ners should have to contract as they see fit. It can be argued, for example, that discrimina-
tion against any group should be prohibited by the implied covenant of good faith if the
covenant protects women. However, this Article need not be concerned with other possi-
ble groups that could be protected because its sole purpose is to focus on women partners
and to determine whether the implied covenant of good faith and public policy prohibit
discrimination against them.
278. See generally 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 6.08(c), at 6:98; REus-
CHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 148, at 286-87; Swinson, supra note 134.
279. See Swinson, supra note 134, at 909. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wells, 19 N.W. 777
(Mich. 1884) ("no man can sue himself at law").
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uity.280 However, there are four reasons why this doctrine should not
bar a discrimination case by a partner alleging that her firm breached
an implied covenant of good faith.
First, this genteel rule originated in a world where partnerships
were small, there were virtually no women partners, there were no
anti-discrimination statutes, and there was no public policy against sex
discrimination.281 Many older statutes mandated sex discrimina-
tion.282 Now there are partners of both sexes and different races, and
Title VII and state laws exist to protect against discrimination. More-
over, these original "small partnerships" have lost their collegiality
and turned into some of the largest businesses in the world.283 This
genteel rule, therefore, lacks viability given these changes and the im-
portant public policies served by permitting discrimination lawsuits by
partners.284
280. See Swinson, supra note 134, at 907. One of the best statements of the rule is that
"[a]n action at law will not lie against a partner upon a demand arising out of the partner-
ship relationship until a settlement of account and balance is struck." Moffatt v. Harden,
648 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 653 P.2d 998 (Or. 1982). The major pur-
pose served by this rule was judicial economy as courts did not want to resolve every trivial
dispute that came up during the course of an ongoing partnership. B. Troy Villa, The
Status of Enforcing Fiduciary Duties in a Limited Partnership After DuPuis v. Becnel Co.,
49 LA. L. REv. 1217, 1223 (1989). However, the rule did not apply once the partnership
dissolved. See infra note 293.
281. This rule is "genteel" in that it comes from a period where prestigious corporate
law firms were made up of white male partners who went to the same prep schools, col-
leges, and law schools. See Jan Hoffman, An End to a Law Firm That Defined a Type, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1994, at 1 (article discussing the closing down of the New York City law firm
of Shea & Gould, which had a reputation as a Jewish and Irish based firm that "spit-in-
your-eye" as distinguished from the more traditional "white-shoe Wall Street firms"-
firms that often forbid their own Jewish lawyers from having contact with clients). It was
virtually inconceivable that one member of this "genteel" legal establishment would sue
another.
282. Supra note 37.
283. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 71 ("As firms get larger.., we will see an increased
effort to centralize management rather than having all partners involved in the decision-
making process .... Most likely, firms will create a spot for an executive director who
essentially will act as a chief operating officer .... In some instances, this business profes-
sional won't even be a lawyer .... Skadden Arps-one of the highest revenue-generating
firms in the nation-already has moved in that direction .... "); Giesel, supra note 15, at
783-84 ("the environment within the firm has changed in the last several decades such that
the collegial atmosphere that once made firms pleasant work settings has all but vanished
for all of the firm's participants.... The emphasis on the profitability of the firm has turned
the firm into a business entity, with little regard for the quality of life of its participants.");
Gordon, supra note 79, at 61 (bemoaning loss of "collegiality in the organization of [law
firm] work"); Holmes, supra note 16, at 14-15 (bureaucracies have been created as firms
become "mega-firms").
284. Indeed, courts have refused to apply this rule to causes of action that did not exist
when the rule originated. See, e.g., 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 6.08, at
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Second, section 405 of the R.U.P.A. now permits partners to sue
each other at law.2ss The commentary explains that section 405 "is a
new and broad remedies provision [reflecting] the policy that
R.U.P.A. should provide ready access to the courts and leave great
discretion in the courts to fashion remedies. '' 2s6 One commentator
says that "R.U.P.A. is likely to encourage courts to narrow the [com-
mon-law] restriction to those situations where it might still be appro-
priate, but courts have been doing this anyway." 2,87 The adoption of
the R.U.P.A. by many states will virtually nullify the old rule.288
Third, the reasons for the old rule have been discredited.28 9 Since
all partners had to be joined as defendants under the aggregate theory
of partnership, the partner suing would, in effect, be both a plaintiff
and a defendant. This rationale is outdated since "common name"
statutes in most jurisdictions permit a partnership to be sued as a sep-
arate entity.290 Moreover, the view that a lawsuit by a partner would
dissolve the firm assumed that partnerships were small businesses that
could not tolerate the strain of such acts. Today, "[t]he idea of corpo-
rations or strangers continuing a business relationship during or fol-
6:108-09 (citing St. James Plaza v. Notey, 463 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1983)). A discrimination claim
is such a cause of action.
285. Section 405(b) reads, "A partner may maintain an action against the partnership
or another partner for legal or equitable relief, including an accounting as to partnership
business to enforce a right under this [Act] including the partner's rights under §§ 401, 403,
and 404." Section 404 is the good faith duty provision. 6 U.L.A. 257 (Supp. 1993).
286. 1 BROMBERG & Rmsmram, supra note 119, app. § 405, at 185. The commentary
explains that the new section is based on an ABA Report that made the following
recommendation:
[U.P.A. § 22] should be entitled "Remedies" and should authorize a direct
suit by a partner against the partnership and one partner against another partner
for any cause of action arising out of the conduct of the partnership business.
In addition to a formal account, the judge should specifically be authorized
to grant any equitable or legal relief he thinks is appropriate, including damages
and attorneys' fees. These changes will eliminate many of the case law proce-
dural barriers to suits between partners that are filed independent of an account-
ing action. In addition, the proposed changes will increase the likelihood that a
judge will be willing to grant relief other than dissolution and/or an accounting.
287. See Swinson, supra note 134, at 925.
288. The U.P.A. was silent on this rule and did not contain any express restriction of
this type. Swinson, supra note 134, at 920. It was a common-law rule. The R.U.P.A. has
already been adopted, with some modifications, by Texas, Wyoming, and Montana. See
Vestal, supra note 118, at 579; 6 U.L.A. 235 (Supp. 1993).
289. However, the commentary to § 405 of the R.U.P.A. says that the old rule is not
dead. 6 U.L.A. 257 (Supp. 1993).
290. See Swinson, supra note 134, at 909. Cf Wayne-Oakland Bank v. Adam's Rib,
210 N.W.2d 121 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) ("[U.P.A. § 13] was not intended to immunize the
partnership entity because of an immunity held by one of the individual partners.").
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lowing a serious dispute seems less unusual than when close
individuals choose to do the same thing."291
Fourth, courts have created numerous exceptions to the restric-
tion on legal actions by partners-one of which applies to many part-
ner discrimination lawsuits.292 This exception involves a situation in
which the partnership is wrongfully dissolved due to the improper ex-
pulsion of a partner.293 Therefore, a discriminatory expulsion will dis-
solve the partnership, violate the partnership agreement, and permit a
legal remedy.294
Thus, courts should reject the common-law rule in its entirety and
permit discrimination lawsuits by partners based on expulsion or acts
of sexual harassment. If a court insists on following the rule, it may
still permit a discrimination lawsuit by a partner who has been
squeezed out of the partnership if the partner fits into one of the ex-
ceptions. Lastly, if a partner has experienced discrimination but has
not actually been expelled from the partnership and resides in a juris-
diction that follows the rule, she can still obtain damages in the ac-
counting proceeding against her firm.295
291. See Swinson, supra note 134, at 910-11. This rule's other purpose was to foster
judicial economy by having all actions settled in one equity proceeding and by permitting
offsetting liabilities to be determined between the partner and the partnership. Id. at 905.
292. One Michigan court has abolished the rule altogether on the ground that partner-
ships are not aggregates of partners, but legally distinct entities that can be sued. Yenglin
v. Mazur, 328 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. App. 1982).
293. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489, 494 (1913) ("Neither is the remedy
[for judicial dissolution and an accounting] in equity for a breach of a partnership agree-
ment exclusive. There may be at law a recovery of all the damages which result, including
damages for profits prevented by a wrongful dissolution.") See also Gherman v. Colburn,
140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 338 (1977) ("[W]here one partner excludes the other, repudiates the
very existence of the partnership and converts all of the partnership assets, the victim may
sue for damages without seeking judicial dissolution and an accounting."); 2 BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 119, § 6.08, at 6:106-07. The wrongful dissolution of the partnership
permits a legal claim because the ousted partner is now an entity distinct from the
partnership.
294. Gevurtz, supra note 119, at 538-40 (on squeeze-outs); Beall v. Baker & McKenzie,
No. 91 CH 9448, mem. op. at 9-11 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 18, 1992).
295. Many courts have said that partners can seek damages in accounting proceedings
against the partnership. See Hooper v. Ragar, 711 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. 1986) (a partner could
have raised fraud and defamation claims in an accounting proceeding against the partner-
ship and sought damages for those alaims). In addition, Title VII has usually been de-
scribed as an equitable claim. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) (court may order "any
other equitable relief" it deems appropriate for a discrimination victim). But see King,
supra note 106, at 128 (discussing whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has negated this
equitable characterization). This suggests that there is nothing problematic about attack-
ing sex discrimination through an equitable procedure like an accounting.
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Conclusion
Women lawyers at all levels are discriminated against and sexu-
ally harassed by their colleagues and superiors. This discrimination
acts as a glass ceiling in the legal world that hinders the professional
advancement of women. Title VII provides women associates with
tools to attack this discrimination and, with increasing frequency, they
have gone to court seeking to vindicate their rights.296 This potential
for legal action has caused law firms to adopt written policies against
sexual harassment. On the other hand, women partners cannot use
Title VII and, until recently, have lacked any legal remedy against dis-
crimination by their fellow partners. Thus, they are generally unable
to reach the most prestigious and high paying partnership positions at
their firms and in the profession. For women partners, the glass ceil-
ing reveals a depth that women associates cannot appreciate.
This Article has demonstrated that women partners can shatter
this glass ceiling by relying on the implied covenant of good faith that
binds all partners, as well as the fiduciary nature of the partnership
relationship. Court decisions and scholars have correctly interpreted
the implied covenant of good faith as barring sex discrimination. The
R.U.P.A.'s mandatory good faith provision and its removal of the re-
striction on partner lawsuits further bolster this interpretation. More-
over, public policy requires such an interpretation as demonstrated by
recent Supreme Court decisions and by the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991.
Admittedly, this extension of the implied covenant of good faith
infringes on the ability of law partners to contract freely and to con-
trol all aspects of their firms. Yet this infringement is no more bur-
densome than Title VII's prohibition on discrimination against
associates. As we approach the 21st century, it is no longer reason-
able for a law firm to insist that it has a contractual right to discrimi-
nate against its women partners. The common law has evolved and no
longer reflects the values of a society in which the segregation of racial
minorities is acceptable and women are meant to be seen and not
heard. The glass ceiling that has injured so many professional women
can only be shattered if courts take this step.
296. As discussed in this Article, during the last few years, several women associates
have filed notable Title VII lawsuits against the law firms for which they worked. See
supra notes 22.
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